Saturday, July 25, 2015

29 Notes for WWI research: Louis Sheehan

THE HEROIC RECORD
of the
BRITISH NAVY

A Short History of
the Naval War
1914-1918

BY
ARCHIBALD HURD
AND
H. H. BASHFORD

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1919


COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF
TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES,
INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN


To the generous help and criticisms of many participants in the events hereafter recorded, and particularly to Admirals Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa Flow and W. S. Sims of the United States Navy; to Vice-Admirals Sir F. Doveton Sturdee and Sir Reginald H. Bacon; and to Lieutenaut-Commander A. D. Turnbull of the United States Navy, the authors desire to express their most grateful acknowledgment.


CONTENTS



{ix}

FOREWORD

In the years immediately preceding the Great War, already so hard to reconstruct, it was not uncommonly suggested that the British seafaring instinct had begun to decline. In our professional navy most thinkers had confidence, as in a splendid machine ably manned; but, as regarded the population as a whole, it was feared that modern industrialism was sapping the old sea-love. That this has been disproved we hope to make clear in the following pages—a first attempt, as we believe, to give, in narrative form, a reasonably complete and consecutive history of the naval war. We have indeed gone further, for we have tried to show not only that the spirit of admiralty has survived undiminished, but that we have witnessed such a re-awakening of it, both in Great Britain and America, as has had no parallel since the days of Elizabeth. We have also tried to make clear that, in a thousand embodiments, in men and boys fallen or still living, it has shone with a spiritual even more than any material significance; and that it has again declared itself to be the peculiar expression in world-affairs of the English-speaking races.
Nor was the little apparent interest shown, just before the war, in the navy and the navy's exercises very remarkable. Our attitude, as a people, toward {x}it had always been a curious union of apathy and adventure. We had been sea-worshippers so long that our reverence had often been dulled by much familiarity, and to such an extent, at times, that, only by the supremest efforts, had we, as a nation, escaped catastrophe. But if, on the one hand, we had lost the neophyte's fire, we had perhaps gained a little in tolerance. The seas had not found in us jealous masters. Our harbours and ships had been at the world's disposal. No empire in history had been so leisurely or less designedly built up, as none was to prove, perhaps, to have been so apparently loosely but yet so organically knit—probably because the idea of empire had always meant less to us than the growing idea of admiralty. Nor is that so obscure as it may at first seem, since, in spite of so much outward indifference, the call of the sea, as closer examination will show, was still among the most insistent to which we responded. There was scarcely a cottage, for instance, even in the remotest highlands, in which the picture of a ship did not hang upon the walls, or that had failed to send a son or a brother or a cousin to serve either in the navy or the mercantile marine. Even in the greyest and most smoke-laden of our central industrial cities, wherever there was a pond, the children sailed their little boats upon it; and, once a year, as to some lustral rite, the town-bred inhabitant took his family to the coast.
That these were indications of any racial significance the non-seagoing Briton had seldom, perhaps, realized. That, because of them, his language had become a familiar tongue in the uttermost parts of the {xi}earth; that because of them every would-be world-tyrant, since Philip of Spain, had been frustrated; that because of them the freedom of nations, no less than that of individuals, had slowly become humanity's gospel—this had been as little present to him as to the inhabitant of Turnham Green that he was living in the greatest harbour of the world; and yet that it was so was but a matter of fact, and indeed the natural outcome of our origin. Since Britain had become an island every wave of invaders had necessarily come to it in ships and with experience of the sea. However various may have been their other contributions to the ultimate nation into which they were to be merged, this had been common to them, they had all been seamen, of whatever temperament or complexion; and, while of the earliest inhabitants of what are now the British Islands, no boat-lore can definitely postulated, the discovery of the famous barge in the Carse of Stirling shows that, 3,000 years before Christ, there must have been some knowledge of navigation; while, of the first Celtic immigrants enough must be assumed, at any rate, to have enabled them successfully to cross the Channel.
Of these the Gaelic Celts, landing from Spain upon the coasts of Devon and Cornwall and in Ireland, seem to have been the pioneers, followed by a stronger invasion of Cymric Celts, who landed in Kent and Essex, and afterward drove the Gaels before them into the northern and western fastnesses. Of later Aryans, the first members of the great Teutonic family to land on these shores were, almost certainly, the Belgae, who settled on the south and east coasts; {xii}while the Scillies and Cornwall appear to have been regularly visited by Phoenician traders and Greek merchants from Marseilles—a sea-borne commerce that continued for many years after the first Roman expedition.
This took place under Julius Cæsar, first in B.C. 55, and its ostensible purpose seems to prove the existence of some kind of pre-Roman British fleet—Cæsar's declared object being to punish the Britons for having sent assistance in ships and men to the Veneti, a kindred Celtic tribe, with which he was at war on the mainland. He appears to have encountered no opposition from it, however, for when he set sail from the coast of France, somewhere between the present ports of Calais and Boulogne, his fleet of war-galleys and transports crossed unchallenged, as far as the sea was concerned.
Achieving little more on his first visit than a demonstration of the power of Rome, on his return, a few months later, with 30,000 men, including cavalry, he penetrated deeply inland, although it was not until nearly a century later that Britain became definitely a Roman province; and it was not until the reign of Vespasian at Rome and his deputy Julius Agricola in Britain that Roman vessels for the first time circumnavigated Great Britain and Scotland. The father-in-law of Tacitus, and himself an extremely able and far-sighted administrator, it was by Agricola that the earliest definite foundations of what was to become the British nation may be said to have been laid. Securing the confidence of the islanders, he not only encouraged amongst them the absorption of Roman {xiii}culture, but protected them against any excess of official exploitation; and, although he was presently recalled by the Emperor Domitian, the principles of administration that he had laid down were generally adopted and developed by his successors in office—forming, in many respects, those of that greater empire whose foundations were already being laid.
It would be hard to exaggerate, indeed, the debt of the nations of British origin to the three and a half centuries of Roman rule, during which period the Christian religion was first preached in these islands. And, though it failed, if that had been its design, to create a strong and independent and self-governing colony—so that when the Roman power was finally withdrawn, owing to impending disasters at the core of the Empire, the Islanders became a prey, if not an easy one, to the next Saxon invaders—its legend of equity as between man and man, its perception and methods of development of natural resources, and its patient thoroughness of execution appealed to the minds and survived in the practice of every succeeding race of immigrants.
That together with these qualities and those to be infused with the next current of invasion there was a real love of the sea among this early population has sometimes been doubted; and Ruskin in one of his essays seems definitely to deny this, adducing Chaucer as an argument. In this great poet of a later period, the first representative voice of emerging England, he finds no expression of it and indeed a positive aversion from all that the sea and sea-travel stood for. {xiv}But whether or not that be the case, and though there were undoubtedly periods, notably just before the rise of Alfred, wherein the nation as a whole, if it may so be spoken of, had largely forgotten the importance of sea-power, each of the three great tribes, who had then overrun the land, had depended for their success upon their maritime skill.
Saxons and Jutes and Angles, they had all been coast-dwellers upon the Weser, the Elbe, and the Ems, the sea-banks between them, and the tongue of land dividing the Baltic from the North Sea; and, while a certain number of them had already become settlers in Britain, attracted by its prosperity under Roman rule, the majority had been pirates, with an established reputation as amongst the bravest and fiercest of ocean-adventurers. Bold as they were, however, and disorganized as the Romanized Britons had become, upon the withdrawal of the tutelage of their governors, it was nearly two centuries before Great Britain could be said to have become definitely Anglo-Saxon, and yet another two before the newcomers themselves had established any sort of unity; and already, by that time, fresh bodies of invaders had begun to make their presence felt.
These were the Wikings or Vikings, men of the Scandinavian fiords, racially allied with the original Saxon conquerors, but whose subsequent conversion, both to Christianity and what seemed to them the tamer life of agriculture, they affected to regard with indignation, not unmixed with contempt. Carrying their arms into every known sea, and believed to have been the first discoverers of America, these Vikings {xv}saw in Great Britain, with its increasing fertility, an ideal and convenient theatre of war.
As early as the later years of the eighth century, they were making sporadic raids upon the Northumbrian coast, and, in 832, they sailed up the Thames, ravaged the Isle of Sheppey, and escaped unscathed. A year later, they attacked the coast of Dorset, and, in 834, they joined the Cornish Celts, when they were defeated, however, by Egbert, King of Wessex—the first, in any real sense, King of England.
But this was little more than a local defeat, and almost every succeeding year saw further raids, until, in 855, a squadron actually entrenched in Sheppey and proceeded to spend the whiter there—the first indication in the minds of the Northmen of serious ideas of invasion. From 866 to 870, they made attacks in such force and with such ferocity that, by the beginning of 871, the whole of England, north of the Thames, lay at their mercy; while, several years before this, permanent settlements of Danes had taken place in Ireland, the Shetland Islands, the Hebrides, and the Orkneys.
This was the situation when, at the age of twenty-two, Alfred, afterward to be called the Great, ascended to the throne. Nor could he well have become king at a less propitious moment. For, with the whole of the north and east now firmly in their grasp, the Danes were already pressing upon Wessex. A battle fought almost immediately after his accession to the throne was rather in the nature of a draw than a victory; and, although the enemy withdrew for a time, a few years later found Alfred at bay in the {xvi}marshes of West Somerset, with the Danes overrunning and apparently in secure possession of some of the most fertile parts of his kingdom.
Fortunately for his people, however, Alfred, for all his refinement, his love of culture, and cosmopolitan boyhood, had inherited in full measure the stubborn Saxon refusal to accept either slavery or defeat; and, a few months later, rallying to his standard an army of Hampshire, Wiltshire, and Somersetshire men, he inflicted upon the Danes, at the battle of Ethandun, the severest defeat that they had yet sustained. By the treaty of Wedmore in 878, he secured the integrity of the south and west, recognizing that, in the north and east, the Danish element was not only too strong to be expelled, but was already becoming welded, not wholly to its disadvantage, with the national life. He agreed, therefore, for his own part, to recognize the Danish influence upon the other side of Watling Street, at the same time persuading its representative leaders to forsake their paganism and embrace Christianity.
Against further aggression, however, from abroad, he determined at all costs to protect the Island; and he was the earliest of his line to realize that his country's first defense was the sea that washed its shores. Already, in 875, he had been the victor in Swanage Bay over a small but strong fleet of pirates; and, after the peace of Wedmore, he set himself to the serious construction and effective distribution of a fleet of war. With no lack of raw material, with good craftsmen, and with a maritime population needing nothing but initiative, he built a navy that, in respect of {xvii}personnel no less than in technical equipment, soon outclassed that of the Danes. Distributed round the coast, he had, according to varying accounts, from 120 to 300 warships; and, behind this bulwark, for the next fifteen years, England achieved an almost miraculous degree of progress. In 896, after a considerable struggle, another attempted invasion was crushed, and Alfred's fleet, grown in strength and experience, extinguished the recurrence of piracy that had accompanied it. Merciful in character and tolerant in statesmanship, toward these pirates he showed no clemency, and, when he died in 901, he left a country prosperous and at peace and with its sea-boards inviolate.
To what extent his son and grandson, Edward the Elder and Athelstan, appreciated the full significance of sea-power we do not know; but it is interesting that Athelstan, during whose brilliant reign the Danish portions of England were largely reabsorbed, conferred the dignity of thane-ship upon any merchant who had made three voyages of length in his own trading vessel—thereby fostering, and even perhaps founding, the dynasty of those merchant-adventurers, upon whom in years to come, and on seas then unknown, Britain was to climb to a destiny beyond his imaginings. Nor can the work of Alfred and Athelstan, in these respects, be discounted because of the eclipse that followed in the reign of Ethelred, and that led to the passing of England, predominantly Saxon, under Danish sovereignty for a quarter of a century, and then, after a further period of twenty-four years, under the permanent rule of the Normans.
{xviii}
Tenacious of its rights, impossible to dragoon, there has always been a strain of inertia in the Saxon character—the reflex of that tolerance, perhaps, which has in so many respects been the secret of its influence throughout the world; and it was probably inevitable that there should have been phases in our national growth, and especially in its adolescence, when this should have seemed to be uppermost. To the minority Celt, with his quicker wits, this has often and justly been a subject of annoyance. In it the Normans, conscious in their persons of the latest current of oversea adventure, avid of culture, and contemptuous of ignorance, saw, and at once seized, their opportunity. For men of their enterprise, intellectual subtlety, and disciplined military energy, the prosperous island, with its clannish dissensions and lack of organization, seemed an obvious prey. And if, in the immediate moment, they were largely successful owing to the flank attack upon Harold by his brother Tostig, it was to a lack of vision, curiously Anglo-Saxon, that they were hardly less indebted for their victory.
Gathering for the defense of the realm, both by land and sea, the largest forces that had ever been collected in England, had William and his armies tried to land a month or two earlier they might well have done so in vain. But with August and September came the demands of the harvest, the autumn ploughing, and the neglected farms. As so often before and since in English history, the parochial and individual obscured the national. William had not come. Perhaps he would never come. The discontented soldiery {xix}could not be kept together. The ships of the Fleet, or many of them, had to return for re-fitting, and, when on September 28th, William arrived at Pevensey, three days after Harold had defeated his brother at Stamford Bridge, it was to land unopposed both on shore and at sea. Moreover, there was yet another factor, and one also that was to recur again and again in English history—a failure, fresh from military victory, to appreciate the value of sea-power—that contributed not a little to Harold's defeat. By October 14th, the date of the Battle of Hastings, the English Fleet had again been mobilized, and held the Channel. Between their position in Sussex and their base in France, the Normans' connections had been cut; and, just as in later years it was Nelson's "storm-tossed ships upon which the Grand Army never looked" that stood between Napoleon and the dominion of the world, so might Harold's, had he trusted them more fully, have stood between William of Normandy and the conquest of England.
With William's forces dependent for their supplies upon the rapidly dwindling stores of the surrounding country; with that silent pressure behind him of England's naval power—there would have been time and plenty, had Harold been content to wait, for the English armies to have consolidated themselves in overwhelming strength. But it was not to be. Dazzled by his recent success, and thinking in terms of armies rather than navies, he forced the issue and was defeated, and England passed under Norman power; and yet so incompletely that there are few Englishmen of to-day who, on reading the story of the Battle {xx}of Hastings, do not instinctively associate themselves with the defeated Harold rather than with the conquering William.
Nor is that as remarkable as it might superficially appear, since, within a very few decades of the Battle of Hastings, the same absorptive process that had been so characteristic a reaction of these islands to their previous conquerors was again in full swing. Even the Romans, although in Gaul and Spain they had succeeded in replacing the original dialects with their own stately language, had never succeeded in Latinizing Britain to any appreciable extent; and, while it is true that many Roman contributions remain as permanent features of our laws and customs, their four hundred years' sojourn left a scarcely perceptible impress upon the tongue of the supposedly defeated. Just as in Roman times, too, there was a considerable and real mingling, both in municipal life and in actual marriage, between the original inhabitants and the Roman colonists, so, in Saxon times, we find a similar process always at work in varying degrees, and indeed officially encouraged by several of the most far-sighted of the Anglo-Saxon kings and administrators. A similar absorptive phenomenon became observable in the later relations of Saxon and Dane; and, with the loss of Normandy, in the reign of King John, and the common cause then made between the French-derived barons and the English hitherto so despised by them, the world was to hear in Magna Charta the first authentic word of the England that we know to-day.
Nor was this process, unique though it was, as far {xxi}as recorded history can inform us, altogether inexplicable when the position of Great Britain and its succeeding invaders is considered. To each group of these, in the then world, it was an Ultima Thule. Beyond it, as far as they knew, there was no other—it was the verge of all things. To each its occupation had been an adventure, presumably undertaken by the most daring of the represented race. Each was at bay there to those that followed and of a spirit and fibre that could not easily be obliterated; and, in each, despite the ferocity of the times, was the respect of brave men for each other. Centuries later, on the other side of the Atlantic, similar conditions were to come into being; and it may well be that, in the larger island of America, we are witnessing a similar process on an extended scale.
But America was then in the womb of time, though it is a curious and significant fact that its discovery largely coincided with that great renaissance of the sea-instinct of England, embodied in the persons of the Elizabethan sailors. Up to then, the English national purview had been almost wholly insular and focussed on the Continent. The Anglo-Continental dreams of the Norman and Plantagenet kings had scarcely died; and they had died hard. The loss of Calais, perhaps the culminating factor in bringing about the new vision so soon to dawn, had seemed, at the time, nothing but a disgrace and a disaster, and far from the beginning of a greater epoch.
Yet it was no less than this, and, thence onward, we see the England, that had been on the world's edge, looking toward the New World, and perceiving, {xxii}by right of its position and history, a wider destiny opening overseas. Fighting more stubbornly than ever against every attempt to make it an appanage of Europe, the eyes of England began to turn more and more constantly to those just-discovered realms with their incalculable future. In the imagination of the Celt, the organizing power of the Roman, the tenacity of the Saxon, the daring of the Norman, and in the sea-lore of them all, it seemed that Fate had been slowly forging a new instrument for the new task. It was only the realization of it that was to seek in the composite race that had thus been built up; and it is not too much to say, perhaps, that the loss of Calais was the right-about-turn that brought this about. Not Europe but the West was the new watchword. But the corollary to that was a new conception of the sea. It was no longer the means of defense, insulating Britain from her foes. It was the highway of her full and peculiar national expression. As never before and not often perhaps since, the sense of what admiralty meant flooded through the nation; and though, as in all the enterprises of human society, the motives in this one were no doubt mixed—though the desire for gold and the lust of fighting for fighting's sake were dominant in the minds of many of those sailors—it is equally clear that, for the best and finest of them, the idea of admiralty had a definite spiritual meaning.
As we gather from their letters and records, they had begun to realize in themselves the upholders and missionaries of a nobler life. They were in true succession to the best of those Norman knights, whose {xxiii}spiritual contribution to England they had inherited; and, in admiralty, as they dreamed of it, we may trace the reincarnation, with a fuller and wider outlook, of that older chivalry.
These then were their objects, and the means was the navy, whose first foundations, as we now know it, had already been laid in the reign of Elizabeth's father, Henry VIII. Up to that time, though the Government had possessed the right, in times of war, to employ merchant shipping, there had been no definite navy, permanently established, in the modern sense of the word. In return for certain privileges, merchant ship-owners—and especially, in earlier days, those of the Cinque Ports—were under contract, on demand of the king, to supply a specified number of vessels, manned and equipped for war. It was with fleets so assembled that, in 1212, the English had raided Fécamp and prevented a French invasion; that, two years later, in a similar action under William Longsword, they had again destroyed the French Fleet; and that, in 1334, one of the greatest British naval victories had been won at Sluys over vastly superior numbers. And, though the Cinque Ports had, by this time, already dwindled from their earlier importance, similar arrangements were in force, when Henry VIII came to the throne, with the merchant shippers of Bristol, Plymouth, Newcastle, and many other quickly growing ports.
Under Henry VIII, however, we find coming into being the important Government dockyards of Portsmouth, Deptford, and Woolwich, and every provision made for the regular supply of the timber requisite {xxiv}for their needs. The same reign witnessed the establishment of the Navy Office, out of which our present Admiralty has grown, and the granting of a charter to Trinity House—that corporation of "godly disposed men who, for the actual suppression of evil disposed persons bringing ships to destruction by the shewing forth of false beacons, do bind themselves together in the love of our Lord Christ, in the name of the Master and Fellows of the Trinity Guild, to succour from the dangers of the sea all who are beset upon the coasts of England, to feed them when a-hungered, to bind up their wounds, and to build and light proper beacons for the guidance of mariners." And, although at the time of the Armada, as indeed ever since in moments of maritime urgency, a large bulk of the British Fleet consisted of transformed merchantmen belonging to private owners, the Elizabethan admirals found at their disposal the rudiments, at any rate, of a specialized navy.
How gloriously, and to what purpose, against what was then the greatest Power in the world, they used their inferior instrument, with its improvised auxiliaries, is the birth-story of British admiralty. Pitted not only for life, but, as it was to turn out, for the common freedom of the seas, they showed the world a spectacle of such a victory against odds as it had scarcely beheld since the Homeric ages. On the one hand, it saw an empire, one of the greatest ever known, under the ablest of statesmen and soldiers—an empire including Spain and Portugal, most of the Netherlands, and nearly the whole of Italy; Tunis, Oran, Cape Verde, and the Canary Islands in Africa; {xxv}Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Cuba in America; the mastery of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; and a yearly revenue ten times that of England—and on the other a little island, of which Wales and Scotland were still largely independent, containing a population less by two million than that of London and its suburbs to-day, and possessing beyond its own coast not a yard of territory overseas.
Such were the odds, and the issue was but one more instance of the inevitable decisiveness of the human factor—a factor that to-day, perhaps, such has been the extravagant growth in the weight and precision of modern weapons, has tended to become once more a little obscured. That history has revealed it again, just as it revealed it for us in the case of the Elizabethans, we hope to show; and, if fortune fought for them, it was not until they had proved themselves superior to it in skill, courage, and equanimity.
"Touching my poor opinion," wrote Sir Francis Drake to Queen Elizabeth on April 15, 1588, how strong your Majesty's Fleet should be to encounter this great force of the enemy, God increase your most excellent Majesty's forces both by sea and land daily; for this I surely think there was never any force so strong as there is now ready or making ready against your Majesty and true religion, but that the Lord of all strength is stronger and will defend the truth of His word, for His own name's sake, unto the which be God all glory given. Thus all humble duty, I continually will pray to the Almighty to bless and give you victory over all His, and your enemies.
"We met with this fleet," wrote Hawkins to Sir {xxvi}Francis Walsyngham on July 31st in the same year, "so

Sunday, July 19, 2015

29.3. Save this (saved only for) for notes for Project on WWI. Louis Sheehan.

France Through English Eyes

With Rene Bazin's Appreciation.

Referring to the article printed below, which appeared in The London Times Literary Supplement of Oct. 1, and which the French Government ordered to be read in all Parisian schools, M. Rene Bazin writes in l'Echo de Paris:
Is not this language admirable? What full and flowing phrases. They are like a ship filled with grain sailing into port with her sails full. Preserve them, these fugitive lines written by a neighbor, and read them to your children. They will teach them the greatness of France and the greatness of England.
The whole world recognizes two qualities in the Englishman: his bravery and his common sense. We know that the Englishman is true to his given word, and that even in the antipodes he never changes his habits. As I write, the postman brings me a letter from the front, dated Oct. 17. The cavalryman who sends it tells of our Allies. "We are fighting the enemy's cavalry," he writes, "and for two days my brigade was in action with the British. They know how to fight and they astonish us by their marvelous {154}powers of organization and their coolness."
Yes, we know that of old. We also know that England never closes her doors to liberty. We have a confused memory of the hospitality given to our priests in the times of the Revolution. Now England provides us with fresh proof of her kindness of heart. You have heard the news—the professors and students of the Catholic University of Louvain invited to Cambridge. The destroyed Belgian university reconstituted in the home of the celebrated English university. What a magnificent idea!
I do not know whether the author who has spoken so well of France in the great English newspaper has ever visited this country. But he has surely meditated on our history and has divined the reason of the very existence of France; why she merits love beyond her frontiers, and why she should be defended "like a treasure." England is not made up of traders, soldiers, sailors, politicians, but also—and that is what the French people will learn better every day—of poets, subtle philosophers, and of thoughtful and religious spirits.
In truth, the day which Joan of Arc foresaw has arrived. She did not hate the English. It was only their intolerable rule of the kingdom which was hateful to her. The good maid of Lorraine said that after having driven the English out of France she would reconcile them with the French and lead them together in a crusade. This has become true. Her dream is accomplished. The crusade is not against the Saracens, but it is a crusade all the same.

29.3.   Save this (saved only for) for notes for Project on WWI.  Louis Sheehan.

Saturday, July 18, 2015

Nebulla againn Louis Sheehan

ICARUS


W20 (2,4,34,164) [ICARUS] (Metal=2,Mines=1,Population=42,Limit=75,Turns=3)
  (F31[DRACO]-->W34 F222[DRACO]-->W34)

W34 (20,191,237) [ICARUS] (Industry=30/2,Metal=2,Mines=2,Population=50R,
     Limit=100,Turns=4,I-Ships=2)
  F31[DRACO]=2 (Moved,Cargo=2)
  F222[DRACO]=2 (Moved,Cargo=4)
  F44[ICARUS]=1 (Moved,Cargo=1)
  F171[ICARUS]=4 (Moved,Cargo=4)

W58 (17,79,185,246) [ICARUS] (Captured,Industry=2,Metal=2,Mines=2,
     Population=16,Limit=49,Turns=1)  V78:Arcturian Moonstone
  F139[ICARUS]=2 (Moved,Cargo=2)
  F183[ICARUS]=0 (Captured)

W72 (191,226,246) [ICARUS] (Industry=1,Metal=9,Mines=6,Population=27,Limit=41,
     Turns=2,I-Ships=1)
  (F131[ICARUS]-->W246 F139[ICARUS]-->W246 F157[ICARUS]-->W246)

W95 (140,152,237,242) [ICARUS] (Metal=1,Mines=1,Population=21,Limit=65,
     Turns=2)  V86:Blessed Stardust
  (F44[ICARUS]-->W237 F177[ICARUS]-->W152 F255[ICARUS]-->W152)



W118 (12,191,216) [ICARUS] (Metal=2,Mines=2,Population=56,Limit=71,Turns=2)
     V5:Nebula Scrolls, Vol. V  ,,-- Louis Sheehan
  (F145[ICARUS]-->W216 F157[ICARUS]-->W191)

W152 (95,174,185,242) [ICARUS] (Captured,Metal=1,Mines=1,Population=26,
     Limit=67,Turns=1)
  F19[ICARUS]=0 (Captured)
  F177[ICARUS]=6 (Moved,Cargo=2)
  F255[ICARUS]=6 (Moved)




Friday, July 17, 2015

Marshal Berthier

In 1813, Marshal Berthier rejoined Napoleon as chief of staff and served throughout the campaign in Germany. The next year as the fighting entered France, he was wounded by a lance blow to the head at Brienne. After Napoleon's abdication, the Bourbons rewarded him as a Peer of France and Commander of Saint Louis.
When Napoleon escaped from Elba in 1815 for the Hundred Days, Berthier followed King Louis XVIII into exile, accompanying him to Ghent. Once there he found the king and his advisors distrustful of him, and Napoleon struck him from the list of marshals for leaving France in the company of the king. Unsure of what to do, Berthier traveled to his in-laws' home in Bamberg.
While in Bamberg, on June 1st he was looking out a third floor window, watching the Russian cavalry march through the town, when he fell out the window and to his death. His death was a mystery, with some saying it was an accident of him leaning too far out the window. Others suggested it was a suicide since he was rejected by both the king and Napoleon and now was forced to watch Russian troops march against France again. Still others considered it an assassination, with stories of masked men entering his room and pushing him, intent on not allowing Napoleon's indispensable marshal to rejoin the Emperor. If it was assassins, they may have altered the course of history, as after the Battle of Waterloo Napoleon said, "If Berthier had been there, I would not have met this misfortune."3
The cause of Berthier's death has never been solved. The historian Charles Mullié alleged that six masked men belonging to a secret society of Neuchâtel entered his room and pushed him to his death.4 Colonel Maceroni, a former aide-de-camp to Marshal Murat, recorded in his memoirs that the former Minister of Police Joseph Fouché implied to him that Berthier's death was ordered, but would not say more. Meanwhile, Fouché's successor as Minister of Police, Count Decazes, told Colonel Maceroni that Berthier's death was directly related to the death of an important man in November of 1814 in Paris under mysterious circumstances.5

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543 Pa. 132, *; 669 A.2d 940, **;
1996 Pa. LEXIS 10, ***

ROBERT D. CHRISTIANA, Appellant v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYES' RETIREMENT BOARD, Appellee

No. 75 W.D. Appeal Docket 1994

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

543 Pa. 132; 669 A.2d 940; 1996 Pa. LEXIS 10

September 18, 1995, ARGUED


January 18, 1996, DECIDED

PRIOR HISTORY:  [***1]  Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court Entered July 28, 1994, at No. 1745 C.D. 1993, Affirming the Opinion and Order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board Dated June 24, 1993 at No. 117-16-8296. 166 Pa. Cmwlth. 300, 646 A.2d 645 (1994). JUDGES BELOW: CRAIG, COLINS, MCGINLEY, PELLEGRINI, FRIEDMAN, KELLEY, NEWMAN, JJ. (Cmwlth.).

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Mr. Robert D. Christiana, APPELLANT, Pro se.

For Public School Employes' Retirement Board, APPELLEE: Louis Sheehan, Esquire. For Attorney General's Office, APPELLEE: Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Esquire.

JUDGES: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERT N. C. NIX, JR., FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, MONTEMURO, JJ. Mr. Justice Montemuro, who was sitting by designation, did not participate in the decision of this case.

OPINION BY: ZAPPALA

OPINION


 [**940]   [*134]  OPINION

JUSTICE ZAPPALA

DECIDED: JANUARY 18, 1996

Appellant, Robert D. Christiana, is a former superintendent of the Upper St. Clair School District. Prior to his retirement, the School District had purchased certain annuities for Christiana. Christiana requested that the amounts paid for the annuities be included by the Public School Employes' Retirement System (PSERS) in its calculation of his final average salary for retirement purposes. After an administrative hearing, the Public School Employes' Retirement Board (Board) entered an order directing that the annuities were not to be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's order in an en banc decision. We granted Christiana's petition for allowance [***2]  of appeal and now affirm.

The Board's opinion set forth detailed factual findings that are summarized as follows. Christiana was hired as the superintendent by the School District in July of 1979 at a starting salary of $ 52,000. He had been employed previously by school districts in  [**941]  Michigan and New York in various positions and had served as the superintendent of Pennsylvania's Springfield Township School District. Christiana's salary was increased over the next few years:

1980-1981 $ 58,000

1981-1982 $ 63,500

1982-1983 $ 65,723

1983-1984 $ 71,000

In the next five years, the School District reported the following figures as Christiana's salary to PSERS:
 [*135]  1984-1985 $ 71,000
1985-1986 $ 71,000

1986-1987 $ 71,000

1987-1988 $ 74,000

1988-1989 $ 80,000

Beginning with the 1984-1985 school year, the School District also expended funds to purchase single premium annuities for Christiana. The School District did not report the expenditures as part of Christiana's salary to PSERS or pay retirement contributions on those amounts. The minutes of Upper St. Clair School Board's meetings at which the annuity payments were addressed indicate [***3]  that the annuity payments were to be made for purposes of purchasing prior years' seniority pension credit. 1 The minutes reflect the costs of the annuity purchases:

FOOTNOTES

1 The minutes also indicate that the annuity payments were "in lieu of salary increases." For the school year 1987-1988, in which Christiana also received a salary increase of $ 3,000, the minutes state that "in lieu of any additional salary increase," the School District shall purchase a single premium annuity for purposes of purchasing prior years' seniority pension credit at a cost of $ 9,500.


1984-1985 $ 5,000

1985-1986 $ 7,000

1986-1987 $ 10,000

1987-1988 $ 9,500

By early November of 1988, the School Board was apprised of Christiana's intention to retire at the end of the 1988-1989 school year. On November 14, 1988, the School Board adopted a resolution relating to Christiana's anticipated retirement:
RESOLVED, That for the 1988-89 school year, the salary for the Superintendent shall be $ 80,000; and further,
 [***4] 
RESOLVED, That commencing with the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield or equivalent medical and hospitalization benefits applicable to building administrators shall be continued for the Superintendent until his attaining age 65, and for his wife Nancy, until her attaining age 65, at District expense; and further,
RESOLVED, That the District shall reimburse the Superintendent during the 1988-1989 school year for costs incurred  [*136]  for the services of a financial planner, such reimbursement not to exceed $ 2,000; and further,
RESOLVED, That the District shall purchase for the Superintendent three years' pension credit under the State Retirement Plan for his service in the United States Air Force as permitted by the laws of Pennsylvania; and further,
RESOLVED, That the District shall provide the Superintendent with an annuity or other equivalent payment at a cost to the District of $ 19,200 for purposes of purchasing for the Superintendent pension credit under the State Retirement Plan for service as an educator in positions prior to his employment under the Pennsylvania retirement system, as permitted [***5]  by the laws of Pennsylvania; . . .
The annuity payment of $ 19,200 for the 1988-1989 school year became problematic due to changes in the federal tax code that were effective as of January 1, 1989. In response, the School Board rescinded the resolution of November 14, 1988, and adopted a second resolution on January 9, 1989. The resolution split the $ 19,200 payment into two separate payments of $ 9,500, which was backdated to the 1988 calendar year, and of $ 9,700, which was to be made at or prior to Christiana's retirement date of June 30, 1989:
MOTION: By Wellington: WHEREAS, the Board of School Directors at its regular meeting on November 14, 1988, adopted certain resolutions relating to the salary and the benefits payable to or for the benefit of the Superintendent; and
WHEREFORE, prior to the adoption of such resolutions it was represented to the Superintendent that the Board would consider  [**942]  modification to those resolutions after the Superintendent and the District had an opportunity to consult with their respective advisors, and such consultations have taken place and the Board is prepared to make certain modifications;
NOW, THEREFORE,  [***6]  BE IT RESOLVED, that with the consent and agreement of the Superintendent, the resolutions  [*137]  adopted by the Board at its November 14, 1988, meeting relating to the salary and benefits payable to or for the benefit of the Superintendent be and are hereby rescinded and the following resolutions are adopted in their place and stead:
RESOLVED, that for the 1988-89 school year, the salary for the Superintendent shall be $ 80,000; and further,
RESOLVED, that commencing with the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield or equivalent medical and hospitalization benefits then applicable to Building Administrators shall be continued for the Superintendent until his attaining age 65, and for his wife, Nancy, until her attaining age 65, at District's expense . . .
RESOLVED, that the District shall reimburse the Superintendent during the 1988-89 school year for costs incurred for the services of a financial planner, such reimbursement not to exceed $ 2,000; and further,
RESOLVED, that the District, in recognition of the superior manner in which the Superintendent has performed his duties and responsibilities,  [***7]  shall provide the Superintendent in calendar year 1988 with additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,500; and further,
RESOLVED, that the District shall, at or prior to the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, pay to or on behalf of the Superintendent additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,700 plus an amount necessary to purchase for the Superintendent three years' pension credit under the State Retirement Plan in recognition of his service in the United States Air Force, as permitted by the laws of Pennsylvania.
Pursuant to this resolution, the School District purchased an annuity in the amount of $ 9,500. The annuity payment was not reflected in Christiana's regular salary. The $ 9,700 payment made in 1989 was treated differently, however. Christiana received that payment directly, but the School District in turn reduced his monthly take-home pay and used the payroll  [*138]  deductions to purchase the 1989 annuity. From March of 1989 through June of 1989, the School District reported additional remuneration of $ 8,730 to PSERS that reflected the payroll changes.

Christiana submitted an application for retirement to PSERS on August 8, 1989. On [***8]  January 19, 1990, PSERS sent a letter advising the School District that after review of the School Board's minutes of November 14, 1988, and January 9, 1989, the $ 8,730 reported did not appear to be Christiana's normal salary and that the amount could not be used in calculating his retirement benefits. The School District was requested to submit a form to reflect this change in the reported salary.

The School District did not comply with the request. Instead, a form was sent increasing the salary report by the sum of $ 970 -the difference between the $ 9,700 annuity purchase for 1989 and the $ 8,730 originally reported as salary. In a letter dated February 9, 1990, the School District's business manager noted the correction and indicated that in addition, the report for the fourth quarter of 1988 had failed to report a payment of $ 9,500 to Christiana. The letter stated that the School District viewed the payments as merit increases. On February 27, 1990, PSERS requested a copy of the School District's merit pay policy. The School District did not respond.

On December 19, 1990, PSERS informed Christiana that his request to include the $ 9,500 for the 1987-1988 school year and the [***9]  $ 9,700 for the 1988-1989 school year in its calculation of his final average salary for retirement purposes had been denied. An administrative hearing was held on September 11, 1991, before a hearing examiner to consider whether the $ 19,200 should be considered as compensation under the Public  [**943]  School Employees' Retirement Code. 2 PSERS learned then that the School District had purchased annuities for Christiana during the four previous school years (1984-1988). At the hearing, Christiana sought for the first time to add  [*139]  each of those annuity purchases to the salary amounts reported by the School District to PSERS. Christiana's take-home pay did not reflect those payments, and as noted earlier, the School District never included any of the annuity purchases in its salary reports to PSERS during those four years.

FOOTNOTES

2 Act of October 2, 1975, P.L. 298, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 8101-8104.


The hearing examiner recommended that the $ 19,200 should be excluded from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary [***10]  because the amount was properly characterized as nonincludable "severance payments" under the Retirement Code. The hearing examiner also recommended that the four annuity payments made during 1984-1988 be included in the calculation of final average salary as compensation.

The Board determined that Christiana had not properly raised the issue relating to the four annuity purchases in the earlier years, but nevertheless addressed the issue because there were sufficient facts on the record for its resolution. The Board concluded that the nonsalary reduction tax shelter annuity payments were not includable as Retirement Code compensation because they were nonstandard and/or nonregular remuneration as well as being bonuses and fringe benefits. The $ 19,200 annuity purchases in the 1988-1989 school year were found not to be includable in Retirement Code compensation because the payments were components of a severance package and were also characterized as nonincludable bonuses and fringe benefits. On June 24, 1993, the Board entered an order directing that none of the annuity purchases were to be included as Retirement Code Compensation. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's order.  [***11]  HN1

On appeal from a final adjudication of an administrative board, our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the board committed an error of law, whether there has been a violation of constitutional rights, or whether necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Estate of McGovern v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377, 517 A.2d 523 (1986). The issue raised in this appeal is whether the Board committed an error of law in determining that the annuity payments were not compensation  [*140]  for purposes of computing final average salary under the Retirement Code.

Section 8102 of the Retirement Code defines the following relevant terms:
HN2"Compensation." Pickup contributions plus any remuneration received as a school employee excluding refunds for expenses incidental to employment and excluding any severance payments.
"Final average salary." The highest average compensation received as an active member during any three nonoverlapping periods of 12 consecutive months with the compensation for part-time service being annualized on the basis of the fractional portion of the school year for which credit is received;  [***12]  except, if the employee was not a member for three such periods, the total compensation received as an active member annualized in the case of part-time service divided by the number of such periods of membership; and, in the case of a member with multiple service credit, the final average salary shall be determined by reference to compensation received by him as a school employee or a State employee or both.
"Pickup contributions." Regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.
"Severance payments." Any payments for unused vacation or sick leave and any additional compensation contingent upon retirement including payments in excess of the scheduled or customary salaries provided for members within the same governmental entity with the same educational  [**944]  and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.

The regulations promulgated under the Retirement Code further refine the definition of "compensation:"
HN3Excludes a bonus, severance payment or other remuneration or similar emoluments received by a [***13]  school employee during his school service not based on the standard salary  [*141]  schedule for which he is rendering service. It shall exclude payments for unused sick leave, unused vacation leave, bonuses for attending school seminars and conventions, special payments for health and welfare plans based on the hours employed or any other payment or similar emoluments which may be negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement for the express purpose of enhancing the compensation factor for retirement benefits.

The restrictive definitions of compensation under the Retirement Code and regulations reflect the Legislature's intention to preserve the actuarial integrity of the retirement fund by "excluding from the computation of employes' final average salary all payments which may artificially inflate compensation for the purpose of enhancing retirement benefits." Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 153 Pa. Commw. 109, 620 A.2d 639 (1993); Laurito v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 146 Pa. Commw. 514, 519, 606 A.2d 609, 611 (1992).

In Laurito v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, the Commonwealth Court affirmed [***14]  a decision of the Retirement Board that refused to include a salary increase for the purposes of computation of retirement benefits for an elementary middle school principal. Dr. Angelo Laurito retired after 42 years of service with the Northern Cambria School District. Laurito's annual salary was negotiated each year with the school district. For the 1984-1985 school year, his salary was $ 32,600. On July 25, 1985, the school board awarded him a $ 16,000 "salary adjustment" for the 1985-1986 school year. In addition, Laurito was granted a leave of absence for the 1985-1986 school year, and his July 1, 1986 resignation for retirement purposes was accepted.

PSERS notified Laurito that the $ 16,000 increase would not be included as compensation for retirement purposes. The Retirement Board upheld the determination, concluding that the claimed salary adjustment was a severance payment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed on appeal, finding that the  [*142]  record failed to establish that Laurito's salary increase was customary for an individual of similar experience within the school district. The court concluded that the school board's actions were tantamount to a severance agreement, stating [***15] 
We find especially persuasive the observation made by the board that the $ 16,000 payment in the final year of service provided a mechanism for the school district to recognize Laurito's devoted service, as well as to remedy the perceived inequity of a below-average salary throughout a working lifetime, by effectuating an inflated final salary for purposes of retirement benefits.

In Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, the Commonwealth Court held that a payment made pursuant to a retirement agreement was not compensation despite the personnel director's performance of consulting services. William Dowler was employed for over seventeen years as the personnel director at the West Chester Area School District before his retirement on July 1, 1988. In addition to his other duties, Dowler conducted all of the school district's labor negotiations in the first three years of his employment. The school district hired private contractors to conduct labor negotiations thereafter.

On November 17, 1987, Dowler and the school district entered into an agreement concerning his retirement. Dowler was to be placed on a [***16]  reduced work schedule from January 1, 1988, to July 1, 1988. He was to be compensated during that time as if he were working a five-day schedule and his duties would include training a replacement and assisting with negotiations. In addition,  [**945]  funds were to be given to Dowler on January 1, 1988, to purchase credit for his military services in an amount not to exceed $ 15,000.

For the first time in Dowler's experience, three labor contracts expired at the end of June, 1988. Dowler assisted in the negotiations while working full-time as the personnel director. A new director was not hired until May, 1988. The school district paid $ 14,854.08 to Dowler, which he used to  [*143]  purchase retirement credit for military service. PSERS concluded that the amount was a severance payment and did not include it as part of Dowler's final average salary in computing his retirement compensation.

Dowler appealed the determination, asserting that he did not receive the benefit of his agreement because he was not given the opportunity to work half-time at full pay. The Board concluded that the money represented a severance payment and dismissed the appeal. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, stating
 HN4

Under [***17]  the Code, all payments, other than for regular professional salary, which are part of an agreement in which a professional member agrees to terminate school service by a date certain, are prima facie severance payments. The claimant may rebut a prima facie case only by showing that the payment is in accord with the scheduled or customary salary scale within the School District for personnel with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.

In furtherance of its responsibility to ensure the actuarial soundness of the retirement fund, the Board has determined that it is statutorily required to exclude nonregular remuneration, nonstandard salary, fringe benefits, bonuses, and severance payments from inclusion as compensation under the Retirement Code. The Board has developed the concepts of "standard salary" and "regular remuneration" as part of its understanding of compensation.
Based upon its interpretation of the Retirement Code and accompanying regulations, HN5standard salary and regular remuneration are defined by the Board as take-home cash, including, among others, (i) amounts withheld [***18]  for tax remittances; (ii) amounts picked up as contributions to PSERS; and (iii) amounts appropriately deferred in qualifying deferred compensation programs, and excluding, fringe benefits, bonuses, severance payments, and non-salary  [*144]  reduction Internal Revenue Code § 403(b) tax sheltered annuities.

The nonsalary reduction tax sheltered annuities purchased for Christiana during the four consecutive school years beginning in 1984-1985 were found by the Board to be nonstandard salary, nonregular remuneration and bonuses or fringe benefits under this analysis. 3 The $ 19,200 in annuity purchases, which the School District authorized after being advised of Christiana's impending retirement, were excluded as being part of a severance package.

FOOTNOTES

3 Such annuities are distinguishable from the annuity contracts purchased under a deferred compensation program authorized under the Fiscal Code, Act of March 30, 1811, P.L. 145 as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 4521.1 - 4521.2. Income deferred under programs authorized thereunder is included as regular compensation for the purpose of computing deductions for employe contributions to retirement and pension programs and for the purpose of computing retirement and pension benefits. 72 P.S. § 4521.1(e). Christiana's assertion that the annuity purchases made on his behalf qualified for treatment as deferred compensation under this provision fails to recognize this distinction and is unsupportable.


 [***19]  Christiana had received salary increases for the first three years after he became superintendent for the Upper St. Clair School District. Over a four-year period, Christiana's annual salary increased from $ 58,000 to $ 71,000. When his salary for 1984-1985 was under consideration, members of the School Board expressed concern that an additional increase would generate negative publicity. A newspaper reporter's comment that Christiana's salary at that time exceeded that of Pennsylvania's Governor was repeated in the headlines of a local newspaper. Unwilling to confront public scrutiny  [**946]  of a salary increase, the School Board elected to freeze Christiana's salary and purchased a single premium annuity for the purpose of purchasing prior years' seniority pension credit.

Richard J. Mancini, the School District's business manager, testified that Christiana was the highest paid school superintendent in Western Pennsylvania, including the City of Pittsburgh  [*145]  School District which was ten times the size of Upper St. Clair's School District. Mancini indicated that the single premium annuity was considered as a way to handle adverse public reaction because responses to salary surveys would not [***20]  include that amount. He considered the annuity purchases to be compensation.

Nevertheless, the record establishes that the School District did not report the annuity payments to PSERS as compensation paid to Christiana and did not pay pickup contributions on those amounts. In fact, the School District continued to purchase single premium annuities even when salary increases were approved in subsequent years. In the 1987-1988 school year, Christiana's salary was increased to $ 74,000 and a single premium annuity in the amount of $ 9,500 was purchased. His salary was then increased to $ 80,000 in the following year in which an additional $ 9,500 was earmarked for an annuity purchase.

With respect to the $ 19,200 annuity payment, the School Board's resolutions indicate that it was part of a comprehensive salary and benefits package developed after notice of Christiana's impending retirement. The School Board's initial resolution dated November 14, 1988, contemplated a salary increase to $ 80,000, payment for services of a financial planner not to exceed $ 2,000, continuing medical benefits for Christiana and his wife until age 65, the purchase of three years' pension credit for military [***21]  service 4, and the $ 19,200 annuity purchase. On January 9, 1989, the resolution was rescinded. A second resolution was adopted which incorporated all of the earlier provisions, but split the $ 19,200 into two separate annuity purchases.

FOOTNOTES

4 The amount expended by the School District for this purchase was approximately $ 21,000. Christiana did not seek to include this amount in the computation of his retirement benefits.


The Commonwealth Court concluded that the Board did not err in excluding the annuity payments from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary. As to the 1988-1989 salary and benefits package, the court found that the record was devoid of any evidence that the package was in accord with the  [*146]  District's regular and standard yearly compensation practices, particularly those involving Christiana himself over the ten-year term of his employment.

We find that the Commonwealth Court did not err in concluding that none of the annuity purchases were includable as compensation for purposes of [***22]  determining Christiana's final average salary. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Retirement Board's conclusions that the annuity payments were remuneration that was not based on the standard salary schedule for which Christiana was rendering service, and that the $ 19,200 payment was a severance payment. Therefore, under the Retirement Code and applicable regulations, the annuity payments were properly excluded from the computation of Christiana's final average salary.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Montemuro, who was sitting by designation, did not participate in the decision of this case.    



ROBERT D. CHRISTIANA, Petitioner v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYES' RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent

NO. 1745 C.D. 1993

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

166 Pa. Commw. 300; 646 A.2d 645; 1994 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 436

March 2, 1994, ARGUED


July 28, 1994, FILED

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for Allowance of Appeal and/or Cross-Petition Granted December 7, 1994.

PRIOR HISTORY:  
[***1]  APPEALED From File No. 117-16-8296. State Agency, Public School Employes' Retirement Board.

COUNSEL: Reed B. Day for petitioner.

Louis Sheehan, Assistant Counsel, for respondent.

JUDGES: BEFORE: HONORABLE DAVID W. CRAIG, President Judge, HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Judge, HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge, HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge, HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge, HONORABLE SANDRA SCHULTZ NEWMAN, Judge.

OPINION BY: JAMES R. KELLEY
OPINION


 [*302]   [**646]  OPINION BY JUDGE KELLEY

Robert D. Christiana, the former Superintendent of the Upper St. Clair School District (District) appeals from an order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board (Board) which denied the inclusion of certain annuities purchased for Christiana by the District in the calculation of his final average salary under the Public School Employes' Retirement Code (Retirement Code). 1

FOOTNOTES

1 Act of October 2, 1975, P.L. 298, as amended,
24 P.S. §§ 8101 - 8104.


The Board made extensive findings of fact. Those findings relevant to the present [***2]  appeal may be summarized as follows. Christiana was first employed by the District in July, 1979 at the initial salary of $ 52,000. Christiana's salaries for the subsequent school years were:


1980-1981
$ 58,000
1981-1982
$ 63,500
1982-1983
$ 65,723
1983-1984
$ 71,000


 [*303]  The following amounts were initially reported to the Public School Employes' Retirement System (PSERS) as Christiana's salary for the next five school years:


1984-1985
$ 71,000
1985-1986
$ 71,000
1986-1987
$ 71,000
1987-1988
$ 74,000
1988-1989
$ 80,000


In November 1988, the Upper St. Clair School Board (School Board) became aware of Christiana's intention to retire from his position at the end of the 1988-1989 school year. Christiana formally retired in August, 1989.

At its November 14, 1988 meeting, the School Board adopted resolutions concerning the 1988-1989 salary and benefits payable to  [**647]  or for the benefit of Christiana. Among the resolutions was one which directed the District to provide Christiana "with an annuity or other equivalent payment at a cost to the District of $ 19,200 for the purposes of purchasing for the Superintendent pension credit under the State Retirement Plan [***3]  … ."

On January 9, 1989, the School Board met and rescinded its resolutions of November 14, 1988, adopting the following relevant resolutions in their place:
RESOLVED, that the District, in recognition of the superior manner in which the Superintendent has performed his duties and responsibilities, shall provide the Superintendent in calendar year 1988 with additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,500; and further,
RESOLVED, that the District shall, at or prior to the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, pay to or on behalf of the Superintendent additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,700 plus an amount necessary to purchase for the Superintendent three years' pension credit under the State Retirement Plan in recognition of his service in the United States Air Force, as permitted by the laws of Pennsylvania. 2


FOOTNOTES

2 The amount necessary to purchase the pension credit for military service was slightly in excess of $ 20,000; however,
Christiana does not seek to characterize this expenditure as "compensation" under the Retirement Code.


 [***4]   [*304]  Pursuant to this resolution, the District purchased an annuity for Christiana in the amount of $ 9,500, but this expenditure was not directly reflected as Christiana's regular salary. 3 In contradistinction, the District in 1989 directly paid Christiana an additional $ 9,700 which increased his regular salary from $ 80,000 to $ 89,700. The $ 9,700 was separately accounted for and deducted from Christiana's take-home salary. The District purchased an annuity for Christiana with the payroll deductions.

FOOTNOTES

3 This annuity, and all others subsequently referred to, were purchased by the District pursuant to
Internal Revenue Code § 403(b) which grants special tax advantages to school employees with respect to annuities purchased for them by their tax-exempt employers.


The District reported to PSERS a total of $ 8,730 in payroll deductions starting in March 1989, through and including June 1989, to reflect the additional compensation called for by the January 9, 1989 School Board resolution. 4 After review of the School Board [***5]  meeting minutes and resolutions, on January 19, 1990, PSERS declined to accept or recognize the reported $ 8,730 for retirement credit purposes.

FOOTNOTES

4 The $ 8,730 in payroll deductions reported to PSERS represented a $ 970 shortfall from the $ 9,700 deduction authorized by the School Board.


By letter to PSERS dated February 9, 1990, the District resubmitted Christiana's reported salary for the 1988-1989 school year. The letter broadened the reporting period to encompass deductions made between January 1, 1989 and June 30, 1989, and adjusted the total salary accordingly. The letter read, in part:
On the original 1st quarter report $ 970.00 of additional compensation was not reported in February, 1989.
Further, in reviewing the report for the 4th quarter of 1988 we discovered that a payment of $ 9,500.00 to Dr. Christiana was also not reported.
The District views these payments as merit increases, no different than merit pay which is paid in accordance with  [*305]  our negotiated agreement with the teachers of  [***6]  the School District.
At the administrative hearing held September 11, 1991 before a hearing examiner to consider the issue of whether the $ 19,200 (comprised of $ 9,500 + $ 9,700) (Enhancement II) paid to Christiana in the 1988-1989 school year should be considered Retirement Code compensation for the purposes of calculating the final average salary, PSERS was made aware that additional remuneration was awarded to Christiana not only in his final year of service but also for the four previous school years (1984-1988) (Enhancement I). At the hearing, for the first time Christiana sought to add Enhancement I to the salaries previously reported to PSERS for the respective years for inclusion as Retirement Code compensation.

 [**648]  According to the relevant School Board meeting minutes, the Enhancement I payments were intended to compensate Christiana "in lieu of salary increases" for the given years. The pertinent resolutions directed that the District purchase a single premium annuity for Christiana for the purposes of purchasing prior years seniority pension credit at the following amounts:


1984-1985
$ 5,000  
1985-1986
$ 7,000  
1986-1987
$ 10,000
1987-1988
$ 9,500 


None [***7]  of these amounts were reflected in Christiana's take-home pay, nor were the amounts formally reported to PSERS as salary.

The hearing examiner recommended that Enhancement II be excluded from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary because the amounts were properly characterized as non-includable "severance payments" under the Retirement Code. The hearing examiner recommended further that Enhancement I be included in the calculation of final average salary because such amounts were properly characterized as includable Retirement Code compensation. Christiana appealed to the Board.

Concerning Enhancement I, the Board concluded that Christiana's non-salary reduction tax shelter annuity payments  [*306]  may not be included in Retirement Code compensation because such payments are non-standard and/or non-regular remuneration as well as being bonuses and fringe benefits. Similarly, the Board concluded that the Enhancement II payments were components of a severance package none of which may be included in Retirement Code compensation because such payments must be characterized as non-includable bonuses and fringe benefits. It is from that order that Christiana now appeals to this court.

 [***8]  On appeal, Christiana argues (1) that he is entitled to have his final average salary adjusted in order to receive retirement credit for single premium tax-sheltered annuities purchased for him by his employer in lieu of salary increases; (2) that PSERS may not sua sponte utilize statistical and public policy considerations when denying a claim for retirement benefits which were not raised before the hearing examiner; (3) that the Board denied Christiana due process by overruling the hearing examiner without providing Christiana reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard; and, (4) that the Board denied Christiana due process by commingling the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in determining Christiana's eligibility for benefits.

We note that HN1o to the description of this Headnote.our scope of review from adjudications of administrative boards is limited to a determination of whether the board committed an error of law, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
Finnegan v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 584, 560 A.2d 848 (1989).

Christiana first [***9]  argues that the Board erred in failing to give effect to the relevant portions of the Fiscal Code of the Commonwealth 5 which expressly authorize the inclusion of tax-deferred income as credit for customary retirement plans. For five years, Christiana argues, the District purchased qualified tax-deferred annuities for Christiana in accordance with the HN2o to the description of this Headnote.Fiscal Code, which provides in relevant part:
 [*307]  The state treasurer shall pay all grants, salaries, annuities, gratuities, and pensions established by law … the treasurer or other officer in charge of payrolls for any … political subdivision may make systematic investments in mutual funds, savings accounts or government bonds or make premium payments on life insurance or annuity contracts to any institution or company licensed and authorized … to accept depositsfor the purpose of funding a deferred compensation program for employes.
72 P.S. § 4521 (emphasis provided by Christiana).

Moreover, Christiana asserts, the Fiscal Code authorizes the purchase of annuities through a deferred compensation program:
 [**649]  HN3o to the description of this Headnote.(a) The governing body of any … political subdivision may, by contract, agree with any employe  [***10]  to defer, a portion of that employe's compensation and may subsequently, with the consent of the employe, purchaseannuity contracts … .


* * *
(e) Such deferred compensation program shall be in addition to, and not a part of, any other retirement benefit program provided by law for employes of the … political subdivision. Income deferred under programs authorized by this act shall continue to be included as regular compensation for the purpose of computing deductions for employe contributions to retirement and pension programs and for the purpose of computing retirement and pension benefits earned by any employe.
72 P.S. § 4521.1(a), (e), (emphasis provided by Christiana).

Christiana maintains that these provisions of the Fiscal Code permit the use of tax-deferred annuity payments which may be purchased by deferring a portion of an employee's compensation. Such deferred income, Christiana contends, is then to be included in the computation of the employee's retirement and pension benefits.

FOOTNOTES

5 Act of March 30, 1811, P.L. 145, as amended,
72 P.S. §§ 4521 - 4521.2.


 [***11]  We cannot disagree with Christiana's reading of the Fiscal Code provision set forth above. However, his argument continues,  [*308]  advancing the assertion that the Board erred by characterizing the annuities as non-salary reduction purchases, or non-regular remuneration, thus rendering such payments ineligible for inclusion as compensation under its interpretation of the Retirement Code.

HN4o to the description of this Headnote.
Section 8102 of the Retirement Code sets forth the following relevant definitions:
"Compensation." Pickup contributions plus any remuneration received as a school employee excluding refunds for expenses incidental to employment and excluding severance payments.
"HN5o to the description of this Headnote.Final average salary." The highest average compensation received as an active member during any three nonoverlapping periods of 12 consecutive months … .
"HN6o to the description of this Headnote.Pickup contributions." Regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.
"HN7o to the description of this Headnote.Severance payments." Any payments for unused vacation or sick leave and any additional compensation contingent upon retirement including payments in excess of the scheduled or customary [***12]  salaries provided for members within the same governmental entity with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.
24 P.S. § 8102.

HN8o to the description of this Headnote.
Section 211.2 of Title 22 of the Pennsylvania Code expands upon the definition of Retirement Code compensation, in pertinent part:
Excludes a bonus, severance payment or other remuneration or similar emoluments received by a school employe during his school service not based on the standard salary schedule for which he is rendering service. It shall exclude payments for unused sick leave, unused vacation leave, bonuses for attending school seminars and conventions, special payments for health and welfare plans based on the hours employed or any other payment or similar emoluments  [*309]  which may be negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement for the express purpose of enhancing the compensation factor for retirement benefits.
22 Pa. Code § 211.2 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Board has developed general concepts in understanding the Retirement Code's meaning of "compensation": "standard salary" and "regular remuneration". Based upon its interpretation of the Retirement Code and accompanying regulations,  [***13]  standard salary and regular remuneration are defined by the Board as take-home cash, including, among others, (i) amounts withheld for tax remittances; (ii) amounts picked up as contributions to PSERS; and (iii) amounts appropriately deferred in qualifying deferred compensation programs, and excluding, fringe benefits, bonuses, severance payments, and non-salary reduction
Internal Revenue Code § 403(b) tax sheltered  [**650]  annuities. Board's opinion, June 24, 1993, pp. 16-17 (emphasis added).

Based on its interpretation of the guiding statutes and regulations, the Board characterized both Enhancement I and II payments to Christiana as non-standard salary, non-regular remuneration, bonuses and fringe benefits. Additionally, the Board characterized Enhancement II as part of a severance payment. Therefore, the Board denied the inclusion of both the Enhancement I and Enhancement II annuity payments in the calculation of Christiana's final average salary.

HN9o to the description of this Headnote.The Board is charged with the execution and application of the Retirement Code and the Board's interpretation should not be overturned unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous.
Panko v. Public School Employees' Retirement System, 89 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 419, 492 A.2d 805 (1985)[***14]  Accordingly, our review of the record suggests that the Board did not err in excluding the annuity payments from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary.

In each of the school years in which Christiana received an Enhancement I payment, the School Board adopted resolutions which directed that "in lieu of a salary increase" for that year, Christiana would benefit from the purchase of a single  [*310]  premium annuity for the purpose of purchasing prior years seniority pension credit. Christiana testified that the Enhancement I annuity payments were used as a means of rewarding Christiana without representing to the taxpayers of Upper St. Clair that his "salary" was substantially increased each year. (Original Record, Transcript of Hearing held September 11, 1991, at pp. 16-18.) Christiana testified he believed that his total compensation included his base reported salary, plus the additional amounts provided for the purchase of the annuities. (Id. at pp. 25-26.) The District's business manager at the time, Richard Mancini, testified that in his opinion "there was no doubt" the annuity payments were compensation. (Id. at p. 67.)

Referring to the first annuity payment of  [***15]  $ 5,000 in 1984-1985, Dina J. Fulmer, a School Board member at the time testified as follows:
Q: What did you understand this $ 5,000 to be?
A: It was a -- well, a reward for his performance. It was a way of compensating him which would not get our name in the paper again.
* * *
Q: Why were the words in lieu of a salary increase chosen?
A: Well, in lieu of means instead of or actually in place of being that lieu is the French word for place. Rather than increasing his base salary, we just decided to purchase this annuity.
(Id. at pp. 83, 85.)

However, regardless of Christiana's or the District's contradictory understanding, the record reveals that the District did not pay pickup contributions on the annuity purchases made on behalf of Christiana beginning with the 1984-1985 school year. 6 Further, in its reports to PSERS, the District did not  [*311]  report the Enhancement I payments as compensation paid to Christiana, nor did the District initially report any of the $ 19,200 Enhancement II payment to PSERS, as compensation or otherwise. Lastly, despite its apparent unwillingness to formally raise Christiana's base salary in the face of public opposition, Christiana [***16]  did in fact receive two regular salary increases totalling $ 9,000 during the five year period under consideration.

FOOTNOTES

6
Section 8102 of the Retirement Code defined "pickup contributions" as regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.


With respect to Enhancement II alone, the record also supports the findings of the Board that the payments constituted part of a severance package. Christiana testified the Board was made aware of his intention to retire prior to their November, 1988 negotiations concerning his 1988-1989 salary and benefits. (Id. at 47-48.) What emerged from those deliberations were resolutions directing (i) that the District, "in recognition of the superior manner in which the Superintendent  [**651]  has performed his duties", pay Christiana additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,500 in 1988; and (ii) that the District pay Christiana an additional $ 9,700 at or prior to his retirement. (Original Record,  [***17]  PSERS Exhibit #10B.)

While the record is silent as to whether Enhancement II was made contingent on Christiana's retirement, it is at the very least payment "in excess of the scheduled or customary" salary Christiana had enjoyed. Further, the final year salary and benefits package, of which Enhancement II was a part, included employer provided amounts for a financial planner, continuing medical coverage for Christiana and his wife, and a one-time offering of a salary reduction tax sheltered annuity. We find the record devoid of any evidence that Christiana's final year package was in accord with the District's regular and standard yearly compensation practices, particularly those involving Christiana himself over the ten year term of his employment.

HN10o to the description of this Headnote.The Retirement Code indicates that the General Assembly wishes to exclude from the computation of employees' final average salary all payments which may artificially inflate compensation for the purpose of enhancing retirement benefits.  [*312] 
Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 153 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 109, 620 A.2d 639 (1993).

Christiana next argues that the Board erred by  [***18]  sua sponte utilizing financial statistics and public policy considerations not considered before the hearing examiner in denying Christiana's claim for retirement benefits. We disagree.

HN11o to the description of this Headnote.The Board, and not the hearing examiner, is the final fact finder in these cases. Dowler. As such, the Board may take official notice of facts which are obvious and notorious to an expert in the agency's field and those facts contained in the agency's files.
Falasco v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 104 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 321, 521 A.2d 991 (1987).

Next, Christiana asserts that in overruling the recommendations of the hearing examiner, the Board denied Christiana reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Christiana contends that the Board made its determination in this matter without his participation and based its decision on facts and issues Christiana never had the opportunity to address.

HN12o to the description of this Headnote.The Administrative Agency Law,
2 Pa.C.S. § 504, states that "no adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard." Christiana was presented [***19]  with just these very opportunities and exploited them by filing a brief and reply brief prior to the hearing; attending the hearing and presenting evidence; and, filing exceptions to the hearing examiner's recommendations, followed by a response to the exceptions filed by PSERS. Our review of the record indicates that the Board studied the complete record, including the arguments advanced by Christiana, in reaching its decision.

Lastly, Christiana raises a due process challenge concerning the alleged commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions between the PSERS and the Board. However, Christiana failed to raise this issue before the Board.

 [*313]  We have held that HN13o to the description of this Headnote.commingling claims may be waived if they are not raised before the administrative board.
Newlin Corp. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 134 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 396, 579 A.2d 996 (1990). 7 Unless a claimant can offer a convincing reason for failing to raise the claim before the Board, the commingling issue is waived. Dowler. Here, Christiana has not offered any explanation for failing to raise this issue below.

FOOTNOTES

7 HN14o to the description of this Headnote.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1551 states, in part, that:
no question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit except (1) Questions involving the validity of a statute … (3) Questions which the court is satisfied that the petitioner could not by the exercise of due diligence have raised before the government unit.



 [***20]  Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge

 [**652]  ORDER

NOW, this 28th day of July, 1994, the order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board, dated June 24, 1993, is hereby affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge



Top of Form

669 A.2d 1098, *; 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 10, **

DR. VERNON R. WYLAND, Petitioner v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYES' RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent

NO. 566 C.D. 1995

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

669 A.2d 1098; 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 10

October 17, 1995, Argued


January 8, 1996, Decided


January 8, 1996, FILED

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:  [**1]  Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied August 5, 1996, Reported at:
1996 Pa. LEXIS 1604.

PRIOR HISTORY: APPEALED From No. File no. 480-24-6298. State Agency: Public School Employes' Retirement Board.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Dee Lafferty Pugh for petitioner.

Louis Sheehan, Assistant Counsel, for respondent.

JUDGES: BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge, HONORABLE GEORGE T. KELTON, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY: JAMES R. KELLEY
OPINION


 [*1100]  OPINION BY JUDGE KELLEY

FILED: January 8, 1996

Dr. Vernon R. Wyland, the former Superintendent of the Garnet Valley School District (school district) appeals from the order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board (board) adopting a hearing examiner's calculation of his final average salary used to determine his retirement benefits under the Public School Employees' Retirement Code (Retirement Code). 1 We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1
24 Pa.C.S. §§ 8101 - 8534.


The relevant facts as found by the hearing examiner, and adopted by the board, may be summarized as follows. Wyland became a member of the Public School Employes' Retirement System (PSERS) by virtue of his employment [**2]  with the Shaler Area School District on June 1, 1983. On July 1, 1987, he began service with the Garnet Valley School District as the District Superintendent for the 1987-1988 school year, at an annual salary of $ 65,000. On December 16, 1988, his annual salary for the 1988-1989 school year was increased to $ 70,200, retroactive to July 1, 1988. On March 28, 1990, Wyland's annual salary for the 1989-1990 school year was increased to $ 74,412, retroactive to July 1, 1989. Wyland's annual salary for the 1990-1991 school year was increased to $ 94,481 as of June 30, 1991.

During the 1989-1990 school year, the school district experienced a prolonged labor action with intense teacher contract negotiations which continued until a new contract was signed in June of 1990. During the labor action, the teachers went out on strike for a period of 25 to 30 days. As a result of the contract negotiations and work stoppage, Wyland became the target of community pressures and antagonisms and he also became the subject of a vote of "no confidence" from the teachers.

During the same period, the school district was engaged in a building program involving the construction of a new middle school building [**3]  and other renovations. At that time, the Garnet Valley Board of School Directors (school board) was sensitive to the adverse public reaction to cost overruns associated with the building program. The teachers' contract negotiations and public reaction to the work stoppage contributed to a significant turnover in the composition of the school board. Six school board members changed as a result of resignations, and new members who were appointed came to the school board predisposed against Wyland as a result of the labor situation and the cost overruns.

As a result, in November of 1990, Wyland was informed by the president of the school board that his contract would not be extended beyond its expiration date of June 30, 1991. Because the school board did not want to take public action on their decision, Wyland was asked if he would rather resign from his position. Wyland concluded that it would be best to resign as he felt it would be easier to tell prospective employers that he had resigned, rather than to say that his contract had not been extended.

After negotiations regarding the terms of Wyland's resignation, on November 21, 1990, the president of the school board sent him a letter [**4]  outlining the terms under which he could resign. The letter stated, inter alia:

3)
The [School] Board guarantees the payment to you of your full salary through June 30, 1991. That salary will not be reduced between now and June 30, 1991.
(a) Your annual raise, ordinarily effective January, 1991, will be deferred. As part of your salary, and in lieu of the annual raise in January, the [School] Board will purchase from you all unused vacation days credited to your account as of June 30, 1991 … .


(b)
Additionally, at the conclusion of your contract on June 30, 1991, the [School] Board, as part of your annual raise, will pay you for all unused sick days then credited to your account … .


(c)
Notwithstanding Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), you have agreed to reimburse the District for its share of the retirement cost allocable to the inclusion of that portion of your salary  [*1101]  represented by payments under Paragraph 3(a) and 3(b).
Wyland accepted the proposed terms as outlined in the letter.

On November 26, 1990, Wyland submitted his letter of resignation, contingent upon the school board's acceptance of the proposed terms in [**5]  the president's letter. At its regular meeting on November 27, 1990, the school board accepted Wyland's resignation effective June 30, 1991. The school board did not take a public vote regarding the content and financial terms of the November 21, 1990 letter to avoid disclosure of their action.

By letter dated June 20, 1991, Wyland submitted a memorandum to the school district's director of business and support services which summarized his accumulated vacation days and sick days. On June 25, 1991, Wyland and the school board president signed a letter of agreement which contained identical terms as outlined in the letter of November 21, 1990.

On June 28, 1991, the school district issued Wyland a check in the amount of $ 20,069.40 as payment for his unused sick days, vacation days and comp days. The payroll document computing Wyland's vacation and sick days noted that the payment was to be considered compensation as per the November 21, 1990 letter of agreement. As required by the letter of agreement, Wyland reimbursed the school district for its share of the retirement costs allocable to the inclusion of the $ 20,069.40 payment.

On June 28th, Wyland also entered into an agreement [**6]  with the school district releasing the school district from any future liability concerning his resignation, in exchange for the payment of $ 20,069.40. The agreement referred to this payment as a "severance payment". Wyland was required to sign the release agreement in order to receive the $ 20,069.40 payment. He signed the release agreement and received the payment.

On September 17, 1991, PSERS received a retirement application from Wyland with an effective date of retirement of June 29, 1991. PSERS contacted the school district regarding the $ 20,069.40 payment to Wyland. The school district sent PSERS a copy of the minutes of the school board meeting in which Wyland formally submitted his resignation, and indicated that no information from his personnel file could be released without his written consent. PSERS then informed the school district that in the absence of any written evidence concerning the reason for the payment, the $ 20,069.40 would not be used to calculate Wyland's retirement benefits. Wyland was sent copies of both letters from PSERS, but his consent for the release of information from his personnel file was never requested by PSERS.

Initially, Wyland's retirement [**7]  benefits were calculated by PSERS using a "final average salary" of $ 79,698. However, without the necessary documentation, the $ 20,069.40 was removed from PSERS' computation of his final average salary. As a result, his retirement benefits were recalculated using a final average salary of $ 73,008. By letter dated April 8, 1992, PSERS informed Wyland that his benefits had been recomputed, and that he was required to repay $ 7,619.03 that he had received in overpayment.

By letter dated April 23, 1992, Wyland requested that PSERS include the $ 20,069.40 in its calculation of his final average salary. On July 1, 1992, PSERS notified Wyland that its Appeals Committee had denied his request. By letter dated July 28, 1992, Wyland requested an administrative hearing.

On July 6, 1993, a hearing was scheduled and held before an independent hearing examiner. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the briefs and motions submitted by the parties, the hearing examiner concluded that the $ 20,069.40 paid to Wyland was a severance payment, and should not be considered in the calculation of his final average salary. In this regard, the hearing examiner specifically found the following:  [**8] 
1. At the time of the November 21, 1990 agreement, [the school district] was under a great deal of political pressure due to the recent teacher strike and cost overruns at the middle school project and [Wyland]'s raise was motivated by [the school district]'s need for [Wyland]'s cooperation.
2. The November 21, 1990 agreement was designed as a buyout of [Wyland]'s  [*1102]  vacation and sick days, both items regularly purchased by [the school district] at the end of a superintendent's term, and both items that would not normally be considered standard salary.
3. Both [Wyland] and [the school district] represented to the general public that [Wyland]'s pay for the 1990-1991 school year was $ 74,412.00, and it would be unfair to now allow [Wyland] to claim a higher pay for retirement purposes.
4. The November 21, 1990, agreement required [Wyland] to reimburse [the school district] for its share of the retirement cost allocable to the inclusion of the $ 20,069.40 payment into [Wyland]'s salary. With a regular salary increase this retirement cost would have been the responsibility of [the school district].
5. [Wyland] was required [**9]  to sign the June 28, 1991, release agreement in order to receive the $ 20,069.40 payment and the release agreement referred to the money as a severance payment.
The hearing examiner also found, inter alia, that: the payment was not based on the standard salary schedule for which Wyland was rendering service; the payment was not made under the school district's scheduled or customary salary scale; and, the payment was made contingent upon Wyland's "retirement" as that term includes terminations which result in the immediate receipt of a pension.

Both Wyland and PSERS filed exceptions to the hearing examiner's decision with the board. The board adopted the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. Wyland then filed a petition for review in this court appeal.

On appeal, Wyland claims: (1) the board erred in determining that the $ 20,069.40 payment in his final year of employment constituted severance pay rather than compensation, thereby reducing his final average salary used for the calculation of his retirement benefits; and (2) his due process rights were denied by PSERS' failure to request information from [**10]  him before eliminating the $ 20,069.40 from its calculation of his final average salary, and by the commingling of the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of PSERS and the board.

We note that HN1o to the description of this Headnote.our scope of review from adjudications of administrative boards is limited to a determination of whether the board committed an error of law, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
Christiana v. Public School Employees' Retirement Board, 166 Pa. Commw. 300, 646 A.2d 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 153 Pa. Commw. 109, 620 A.2d 639 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Because the board is charged with the execution and application of the Retirement Code, the board's interpretation should not be overturned unless it is clear that its construction of the Retirement Code is erroneous. Christiana.

Wyland first argues that the board erred in determining that the $ 20,069.40 payment in his final year of employment constituted a severance payment rather than compensation. In particular, Wyland claims that: there is no evidence that the increase was paid contingent upon his retirement; there is no substantial evidence [**11]  that it was payment for his unused vacation or sick time; his resignation at the end of his contract term cannot be considered to be his "retirement"; the increase was consistent with the school district's compensation plan; and it made his salary comparable to other superintendents in Delaware County.

HN2o to the description of this Headnote.Both the Retirement Code and the applicable regulations contain restrictions on the types of compensation that may be used in calculating an employee's final average salary.
Hoerner v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 655 A.2d 207 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). The purpose of these restrictions is to ensure the actuarial soundness of the retirement fund by preventing employees from artificially inflating compensation as a means of receiving greater retirement benefits. Id.

HN3o to the description of this Headnote.
Section 8102 of the Retirement Code sets forth the following relevant definitions:
"Compensation." Pickup contributions plus any remuneration received as a school employee excluding refunds for expenses  [*1103]  incidental to employment and excluding any severance payments.
"Final average salary." The highest average compensation received as an active member during any three nonoverlapping [**12]  periods of 12 consecutive months … .
"Pickup contributions." Regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.
"Severance payments." Any payments for unused vacation or sick leave and any additional compensation contingent upon retirement including payments in excess of the scheduled or customary salaries provided for members within the same governmental entity with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.
24 Pa.C.S. § 8102 (emphasis added).

HN4o to the description of this Headnote.Title
22 Pa. Code § 211.2 also defines compensation as follows:
Compensation - Excludes a bonus, severance payment or other remuneration or similar emoluments received by a school employe during his school service not based on the standard salary schedule for which he is rendering service. It shall exclude payments for unused sick leave, unused vacation leave, bonuses for attending school seminars and conventions, special payments for health and welfare plans based on the hours employed or any other payment or similar emoluments which may be negotiated [**13]  in a collective bargaining agreement for the express purpose of enhancing the compensation factor for retirement benefits. (Emphasis added.)
HN5o to the description of this Headnote.Whether or not a payment must be considered a severance payment is a question of law. Dowler. Under the Retirement Code, all payments, other than those for regular professional salary, which are part of an agreement in which a professional member agrees to terminate school service by a date certain, are prima facie severance payments. Id. A claimant may rebut a prima facie case only by showing that the payment is in accord with the scheduled or customary salary scale within the school district for personnel with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service. Id.

In this case, both the hearing examiner and the board were presented with the letters of agreement between Wyland and the school board president dated November 21, 1990 and June 25, 1991 which stated, inter alia, that Wyland would be paid for all of his unused vacation and sick days in lieu of his annual raise, and that he would reimburse the school district for its share of the retirement cost allocable to the inclusion [**14]  of this amount. The hearing examiner and the board were also presented with an agreement between Wyland and the school board president dated June 28, 1991 which stated that the parties had reached certain agreements concerning the termination of his employment and severance payments, the terms of which were embodied in the letter of June 25. The hearing examiner and the board were also presented with documentation that Wyland was paid $ 20,069.40 by the school district for 62 unused vacation and comp days, and 93 unused sick days. Clearly, such evidence is sufficient to support the board's conclusion that the $ 20,069.40 paid to Wyland constituted a severance payment as it is defined in the Retirement Code.

Wyland is essentially asking this court to reweigh the conflicting evidence presented to the hearing examiner and the board, and to only accept that evidence which contradicts the plain meaning of the contents of the foregoing documents. However, HN6o to the description of this Headnote.questions of resolving conflicts in the evidence, witness credibility, and evidentiary weight are properly within the exclusive discretion of the fact finding agency, and are not usually matters for a reviewing court.  [**15] 
Herzog v. Department of Environmental Resources, 166 Pa. Commw. 114, 645 A.2d 1381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Moreover, "this court 'may not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency acting within its discretion in the field of its expertise upon substantial evidence … .'" Dowler, 620 A.2d at 644 (citation omitted). The hearing examiner and the board rejected Wyland's claims regarding this evidence. On  [*1104]  appeal, we will not substitute our judgment nor reweigh this evidence.

Wyland next claims that his right to due process and fundamental fairness was denied by PSERS' failure to formally request information from him before eliminating the $ 20,069.40 from its calculation of his final average salary, and by the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions by PSERS and the board. He first argues that his vested property rights to his pension were reduced by PSERS in an arbitrary manner, without notice and without a chance to respond, thereby violating his due process rights.

HN7o to the description of this Headnote.The Administrative Agency Law,
2 Pa.C.S. § 504, states that "no adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard."  [**16]  Wyland was afforded these opportunities and exercised them before the hearing examiner and the board in this case.

As the claimant in Hoerner, we note that Wyland has failed to cite any authority for the proposition that he was entitled to a "pre-reduction" hearing before PSERS in this case. The determination of Wyland's final average salary and the calculation of benefits is simply the result of a staff function performed by PSERS.

Wyland could, and did, appeal the initial determination of his retirement benefits to PSERS' appeal committee and, ultimately, to the board. He filed a brief and a reply brief prior to the hearing before the hearing examiner, attended the hearing and presented evidence, and filed exceptions to the hearing examiner's determination with the board. HN8o to the description of this Headnote.As Wyland was given notice and a hearing prior to the final determination of his retirement benefits, and there exists no authority for a hearing in connection with PSERS' initial review, this claim is meritless. See
Stone & Edwards Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 538 Pa. 276, 648 A.2d 304 (1994) (The initial denial of an insurance license application was the result of a staff function [**17]  performed by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department; as this decision could be appealed to the Insurance Commissioner who would conduct a hearing before the final determination, applicants were not entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the initial denial of a license application).

Finally, Wyland argues that the commingling of the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions by PSERS and the board is violative of his due process rights. In support of his position, Wyland relies on the case of
Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 529 Pa. 535, 605 A.2d 1204 (1994). In Lyness, our Supreme Court stated:
In the modern world of sprawling governmental entities akin to corporations it would be both unrealistic and counterproductive to insist that administrative agencies be forbidden from handling both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, where such roles are parcelled out and divided among distinct departments or boards. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness are certainly desirable ends. Indeed, each administrative board and judge is ultimately a subdivision of a single entity, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but this does not render their collective work as prosecutors, investigators [**18]  and adjudicators constitutionally infirm, nor create an imminent threat of prejudice.
What our Constitution requires, however, is that if more than one function is reposed in a single administrative entity, walls of division be constructed which eliminate the threat or appearance of bias. … [A] "mere tangential involvement" of an adjudicator in the decision to initiate proceeding is not enough to raise the red flag of procedural due process. … Our constitutional notion of due process does not require a tabula rasa. … However, where the very entity or individuals involved in the decision to prosecute are "significantly involved" in the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, a violation of due process occurs.
Lyness, 529 Pa. at 546-47, 605 A.2d at 1209-10 (citations omitted).

Thus, HN9o to the description of this Headnote.where "walls of division" are erected between the parties completing disparate functions within an administrative agency, no due process violation will be found. See, e.g., Stone & Edwards Insurance;  [*1105] 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield, 537 Pa. 485, 644 A.2d 1186 (1994).

Even if we were to adopt Wyland's position that the initial determination and review [**19]  of his retirement benefits by PSERS and the board constitute "prosecutorial" and "adjudicative" functions, there has been no showing by Wyland of a commingling of these functions as proscribed by Lyness. Wyland's initial application was reviewed by a supervisor in the retirement processing section of PSERS. When he was dissatisfied with the determination of his benefits, Wyland requested PSERS' appeals committee to review his claim. When he was dissatisfied with the appeals committee's decision, Wyland submitted a request to the legal division of PSERS for a hearing before a hearing examiner. The independent hearing examiner conducted the hearing and made a recommendation to the board, which was the final arbiter. The board was not involved in the adjudication until Wyland appealed the decision of the hearing examiner to the board. Such a procedure does not involve the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, and does not violate due process. See Duffield.

Unquestionably, under Lyness, HN10o to the description of this Headnote.the mere possibility of bias under Pennsylvania law is sufficient to "raise the red flag" of the protections offered by the procedural guaranty of due process. Stone &  [**20]  Edwards Insurance. However, the appearance of bias proscribed by Lyness must be one which arises from an actual environment of commingled functions. Id. Wyland has not advanced a claim of the actual commingling of functions in the manner in which PSERS and the board conduct their investigations, prosecutions and adjudications. In the absence of any actual commingling, which would give rise to an appearance of bias, Wyland's unsubstantiated claim of commingling is meritless. Id.

Accordingly, the order of the board is affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge

ORDER

NOW, this 8th day of January, 1996, the order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board, dated January 27, 1995, at No. 480-24-6298, is affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge
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543 Pa. 132, *; 669 A.2d 940, **;
1996 Pa. LEXIS 10, ***

ROBERT D. CHRISTIANA, Appellant v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYES' RETIREMENT BOARD, Appellee

No. 75 W.D. Appeal Docket 1994

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

543 Pa. 132; 669 A.2d 940; 1996 Pa. LEXIS 10

September 18, 1995, ARGUED


January 18, 1996, DECIDED

PRIOR HISTORY:  [***1]  Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court Entered July 28, 1994, at No. 1745 C.D. 1993, Affirming the Opinion and Order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board Dated June 24, 1993 at No. 117-16-8296. 166 Pa. Cmwlth. 300, 646 A.2d 645 (1994). JUDGES BELOW: CRAIG, COLINS, MCGINLEY, PELLEGRINI, FRIEDMAN, KELLEY, NEWMAN, JJ. (Cmwlth.).

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Mr. Robert D. Christiana, APPELLANT, Pro se.

For Public School Employes' Retirement Board, APPELLEE: Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire. For Attorney General's Office, APPELLEE: Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Esquire.

JUDGES: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERT N. C. NIX, JR., FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, MONTEMURO, JJ. Mr. Justice Montemuro, who was sitting by designation, did not participate in the decision of this case.

OPINION BY: ZAPPALA

OPINION


 [**940]   [*134]  OPINION

JUSTICE ZAPPALA

DECIDED: JANUARY 18, 1996

Appellant, Robert D. Christiana, is a former superintendent of the Upper St. Clair School District. Prior to his retirement, the School District had purchased certain annuities for Christiana. Christiana requested that the amounts paid for the annuities be included by the Public School Employes' Retirement System (PSERS) in its calculation of his final average salary for retirement purposes. After an administrative hearing, the Public School Employes' Retirement Board (Board) entered an order directing that the annuities were not to be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's order in an en banc decision. We granted Christiana's petition for allowance [***2]  of appeal and now affirm.

The Board's opinion set forth detailed factual findings that are summarized as follows. Christiana was hired as the superintendent by the School District in July of 1979 at a starting salary of $ 52,000. He had been employed previously by school districts in  [**941]  Michigan and New York in various positions and had served as the superintendent of Pennsylvania's Springfield Township School District. Christiana's salary was increased over the next few years:

1980-1981 $ 58,000

1981-1982 $ 63,500

1982-1983 $ 65,723

1983-1984 $ 71,000

In the next five years, the School District reported the following figures as Christiana's salary to PSERS:
 [*135]  1984-1985 $ 71,000
1985-1986 $ 71,000

1986-1987 $ 71,000

1987-1988 $ 74,000

1988-1989 $ 80,000

Beginning with the 1984-1985 school year, the School District also expended funds to purchase single premium annuities for Christiana. The School District did not report the expenditures as part of Christiana's salary to PSERS or pay retirement contributions on those amounts. The minutes of Upper St. Clair School Board's meetings at which the annuity payments were addressed indicate [***3]  that the annuity payments were to be made for purposes of purchasing prior years' seniority pension credit. 1 The minutes reflect the costs of the annuity purchases:

FOOTNOTES

1 The minutes also indicate that the annuity payments were "in lieu of salary increases." For the school year 1987-1988, in which Christiana also received a salary increase of $ 3,000, the minutes state that "in lieu of any additional salary increase," the School District shall purchase a single premium annuity for purposes of purchasing prior years' seniority pension credit at a cost of $ 9,500.


1984-1985 $ 5,000

1985-1986 $ 7,000

1986-1987 $ 10,000

1987-1988 $ 9,500

By early November of 1988, the School Board was apprised of Christiana's intention to retire at the end of the 1988-1989 school year. On November 14, 1988, the School Board adopted a resolution relating to Christiana's anticipated retirement:
RESOLVED, That for the 1988-89 school year, the salary for the Superintendent shall be $ 80,000; and further,
 [***4] 
RESOLVED, That commencing with the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield or equivalent medical and hospitalization benefits applicable to building administrators shall be continued for the Superintendent until his attaining age 65, and for his wife Nancy, until her attaining age 65, at District expense; and further,
RESOLVED, That the District shall reimburse the Superintendent during the 1988-1989 school year for costs incurred  [*136]  for the services of a financial planner, such reimbursement not to exceed $ 2,000; and further,
RESOLVED, That the District shall purchase for the Superintendent three years' pension credit under the State Retirement Plan for his service in the United States Air Force as permitted by the laws of Pennsylvania; and further,
RESOLVED, That the District shall provide the Superintendent with an annuity or other equivalent payment at a cost to the District of $ 19,200 for purposes of purchasing for the Superintendent pension credit under the State Retirement Plan for service as an educator in positions prior to his employment under the Pennsylvania retirement system, as permitted [***5]  by the laws of Pennsylvania; . . .
The annuity payment of $ 19,200 for the 1988-1989 school year became problematic due to changes in the federal tax code that were effective as of January 1, 1989. In response, the School Board rescinded the resolution of November 14, 1988, and adopted a second resolution on January 9, 1989. The resolution split the $ 19,200 payment into two separate payments of $ 9,500, which was backdated to the 1988 calendar year, and of $ 9,700, which was to be made at or prior to Christiana's retirement date of June 30, 1989:
MOTION: By Wellington: WHEREAS, the Board of School Directors at its regular meeting on November 14, 1988, adopted certain resolutions relating to the salary and the benefits payable to or for the benefit of the Superintendent; and
WHEREFORE, prior to the adoption of such resolutions it was represented to the Superintendent that the Board would consider  [**942]  modification to those resolutions after the Superintendent and the District had an opportunity to consult with their respective advisors, and such consultations have taken place and the Board is prepared to make certain modifications;
NOW, THEREFORE,  [***6]  BE IT RESOLVED, that with the consent and agreement of the Superintendent, the resolutions  [*137]  adopted by the Board at its November 14, 1988, meeting relating to the salary and benefits payable to or for the benefit of the Superintendent be and are hereby rescinded and the following resolutions are adopted in their place and stead:
RESOLVED, that for the 1988-89 school year, the salary for the Superintendent shall be $ 80,000; and further,
RESOLVED, that commencing with the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield or equivalent medical and hospitalization benefits then applicable to Building Administrators shall be continued for the Superintendent until his attaining age 65, and for his wife, Nancy, until her attaining age 65, at District's expense . . .
RESOLVED, that the District shall reimburse the Superintendent during the 1988-89 school year for costs incurred for the services of a financial planner, such reimbursement not to exceed $ 2,000; and further,
RESOLVED, that the District, in recognition of the superior manner in which the Superintendent has performed his duties and responsibilities,  [***7]  shall provide the Superintendent in calendar year 1988 with additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,500; and further,
RESOLVED, that the District shall, at or prior to the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, pay to or on behalf of the Superintendent additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,700 plus an amount necessary to purchase for the Superintendent three years' pension credit under the State Retirement Plan in recognition of his service in the United States Air Force, as permitted by the laws of Pennsylvania.
Pursuant to this resolution, the School District purchased an annuity in the amount of $ 9,500. The annuity payment was not reflected in Christiana's regular salary. The $ 9,700 payment made in 1989 was treated differently, however. Christiana received that payment directly, but the School District in turn reduced his monthly take-home pay and used the payroll  [*138]  deductions to purchase the 1989 annuity. From March of 1989 through June of 1989, the School District reported additional remuneration of $ 8,730 to PSERS that reflected the payroll changes.

Christiana submitted an application for retirement to PSERS on August 8, 1989. On [***8]  January 19, 1990, PSERS sent a letter advising the School District that after review of the School Board's minutes of November 14, 1988, and January 9, 1989, the $ 8,730 reported did not appear to be Christiana's normal salary and that the amount could not be used in calculating his retirement benefits. The School District was requested to submit a form to reflect this change in the reported salary.

The School District did not comply with the request. Instead, a form was sent increasing the salary report by the sum of $ 970 -the difference between the $ 9,700 annuity purchase for 1989 and the $ 8,730 originally reported as salary. In a letter dated February 9, 1990, the School District's business manager noted the correction and indicated that in addition, the report for the fourth quarter of 1988 had failed to report a payment of $ 9,500 to Christiana. The letter stated that the School District viewed the payments as merit increases. On February 27, 1990, PSERS requested a copy of the School District's merit pay policy. The School District did not respond.

On December 19, 1990, PSERS informed Christiana that his request to include the $ 9,500 for the 1987-1988 school year and the [***9]  $ 9,700 for the 1988-1989 school year in its calculation of his final average salary for retirement purposes had been denied. An administrative hearing was held on September 11, 1991, before a hearing examiner to consider whether the $ 19,200 should be considered as compensation under the Public  [**943]  School Employees' Retirement Code. 2 PSERS learned then that the School District had purchased annuities for Christiana during the four previous school years (1984-1988). At the hearing, Christiana sought for the first time to add  [*139]  each of those annuity purchases to the salary amounts reported by the School District to PSERS. Christiana's take-home pay did not reflect those payments, and as noted earlier, the School District never included any of the annuity purchases in its salary reports to PSERS during those four years.

FOOTNOTES

2 Act of October 2, 1975, P.L. 298, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 8101-8104.


The hearing examiner recommended that the $ 19,200 should be excluded from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary [***10]  because the amount was properly characterized as nonincludable "severance payments" under the Retirement Code. The hearing examiner also recommended that the four annuity payments made during 1984-1988 be included in the calculation of final average salary as compensation.

The Board determined that Christiana had not properly raised the issue relating to the four annuity purchases in the earlier years, but nevertheless addressed the issue because there were sufficient facts on the record for its resolution. The Board concluded that the nonsalary reduction tax shelter annuity payments were not includable as Retirement Code compensation because they were nonstandard and/or nonregular remuneration as well as being bonuses and fringe benefits. The $ 19,200 annuity purchases in the 1988-1989 school year were found not to be includable in Retirement Code compensation because the payments were components of a severance package and were also characterized as nonincludable bonuses and fringe benefits. On June 24, 1993, the Board entered an order directing that none of the annuity purchases were to be included as Retirement Code Compensation. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's order.  [***11]  HN1

On appeal from a final adjudication of an administrative board, our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the board committed an error of law, whether there has been a violation of constitutional rights, or whether necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Estate of McGovern v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377, 517 A.2d 523 (1986). The issue raised in this appeal is whether the Board committed an error of law in determining that the annuity payments were not compensation  [*140]  for purposes of computing final average salary under the Retirement Code.

Section 8102 of the Retirement Code defines the following relevant terms:
HN2"Compensation." Pickup contributions plus any remuneration received as a school employee excluding refunds for expenses incidental to employment and excluding any severance payments.
"Final average salary." The highest average compensation received as an active member during any three nonoverlapping periods of 12 consecutive months with the compensation for part-time service being annualized on the basis of the fractional portion of the school year for which credit is received;  [***12]  except, if the employee was not a member for three such periods, the total compensation received as an active member annualized in the case of part-time service divided by the number of such periods of membership; and, in the case of a member with multiple service credit, the final average salary shall be determined by reference to compensation received by him as a school employee or a State employee or both.
"Pickup contributions." Regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.
"Severance payments." Any payments for unused vacation or sick leave and any additional compensation contingent upon retirement including payments in excess of the scheduled or customary salaries provided for members within the same governmental entity with the same educational  [**944]  and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.

The regulations promulgated under the Retirement Code further refine the definition of "compensation:"
HN3Excludes a bonus, severance payment or other remuneration or similar emoluments received by a [***13]  school employee during his school service not based on the standard salary  [*141]  schedule for which he is rendering service. It shall exclude payments for unused sick leave, unused vacation leave, bonuses for attending school seminars and conventions, special payments for health and welfare plans based on the hours employed or any other payment or similar emoluments which may be negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement for the express purpose of enhancing the compensation factor for retirement benefits.

The restrictive definitions of compensation under the Retirement Code and regulations reflect the Legislature's intention to preserve the actuarial integrity of the retirement fund by "excluding from the computation of employes' final average salary all payments which may artificially inflate compensation for the purpose of enhancing retirement benefits." Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 153 Pa. Commw. 109, 620 A.2d 639 (1993); Laurito v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 146 Pa. Commw. 514, 519, 606 A.2d 609, 611 (1992).

In Laurito v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, the Commonwealth Court affirmed [***14]  a decision of the Retirement Board that refused to include a salary increase for the purposes of computation of retirement benefits for an elementary middle school principal. Dr. Angelo Laurito retired after 42 years of service with the Northern Cambria School District. Laurito's annual salary was negotiated each year with the school district. For the 1984-1985 school year, his salary was $ 32,600. On July 25, 1985, the school board awarded him a $ 16,000 "salary adjustment" for the 1985-1986 school year. In addition, Laurito was granted a leave of absence for the 1985-1986 school year, and his July 1, 1986 resignation for retirement purposes was accepted.

PSERS notified Laurito that the $ 16,000 increase would not be included as compensation for retirement purposes. The Retirement Board upheld the determination, concluding that the claimed salary adjustment was a severance payment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed on appeal, finding that the  [*142]  record failed to establish that Laurito's salary increase was customary for an individual of similar experience within the school district. The court concluded that the school board's actions were tantamount to a severance agreement, stating [***15] 
We find especially persuasive the observation made by the board that the $ 16,000 payment in the final year of service provided a mechanism for the school district to recognize Laurito's devoted service, as well as to remedy the perceived inequity of a below-average salary throughout a working lifetime, by effectuating an inflated final salary for purposes of retirement benefits.

In Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, the Commonwealth Court held that a payment made pursuant to a retirement agreement was not compensation despite the personnel director's performance of consulting services. William Dowler was employed for over seventeen years as the personnel director at the West Chester Area School District before his retirement on July 1, 1988. In addition to his other duties, Dowler conducted all of the school district's labor negotiations in the first three years of his employment. The school district hired private contractors to conduct labor negotiations thereafter.

On November 17, 1987, Dowler and the school district entered into an agreement concerning his retirement. Dowler was to be placed on a [***16]  reduced work schedule from January 1, 1988, to July 1, 1988. He was to be compensated during that time as if he were working a five-day schedule and his duties would include training a replacement and assisting with negotiations. In addition,  [**945]  funds were to be given to Dowler on January 1, 1988, to purchase credit for his military services in an amount not to exceed $ 15,000.

For the first time in Dowler's experience, three labor contracts expired at the end of June, 1988. Dowler assisted in the negotiations while working full-time as the personnel director. A new director was not hired until May, 1988. The school district paid $ 14,854.08 to Dowler, which he used to  [*143]  purchase retirement credit for military service. PSERS concluded that the amount was a severance payment and did not include it as part of Dowler's final average salary in computing his retirement compensation.

Dowler appealed the determination, asserting that he did not receive the benefit of his agreement because he was not given the opportunity to work half-time at full pay. The Board concluded that the money represented a severance payment and dismissed the appeal. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, stating
 HN4

Under [***17]  the Code, all payments, other than for regular professional salary, which are part of an agreement in which a professional member agrees to terminate school service by a date certain, are prima facie severance payments. The claimant may rebut a prima facie case only by showing that the payment is in accord with the scheduled or customary salary scale within the School District for personnel with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.

In furtherance of its responsibility to ensure the actuarial soundness of the retirement fund, the Board has determined that it is statutorily required to exclude nonregular remuneration, nonstandard salary, fringe benefits, bonuses, and severance payments from inclusion as compensation under the Retirement Code. The Board has developed the concepts of "standard salary" and "regular remuneration" as part of its understanding of compensation.
Based upon its interpretation of the Retirement Code and accompanying regulations, HN5standard salary and regular remuneration are defined by the Board as take-home cash, including, among others, (i) amounts withheld [***18]  for tax remittances; (ii) amounts picked up as contributions to PSERS; and (iii) amounts appropriately deferred in qualifying deferred compensation programs, and excluding, fringe benefits, bonuses, severance payments, and non-salary  [*144]  reduction Internal Revenue Code § 403(b) tax sheltered annuities.

The nonsalary reduction tax sheltered annuities purchased for Christiana during the four consecutive school years beginning in 1984-1985 were found by the Board to be nonstandard salary, nonregular remuneration and bonuses or fringe benefits under this analysis. 3 The $ 19,200 in annuity purchases, which the School District authorized after being advised of Christiana's impending retirement, were excluded as being part of a severance package.

FOOTNOTES

3 Such annuities are distinguishable from the annuity contracts purchased under a deferred compensation program authorized under the Fiscal Code, Act of March 30, 1811, P.L. 145 as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 4521.1 - 4521.2. Income deferred under programs authorized thereunder is included as regular compensation for the purpose of computing deductions for employe contributions to retirement and pension programs and for the purpose of computing retirement and pension benefits. 72 P.S. § 4521.1(e). Christiana's assertion that the annuity purchases made on his behalf qualified for treatment as deferred compensation under this provision fails to recognize this distinction and is unsupportable.


 [***19]  Christiana had received salary increases for the first three years after he became superintendent for the Upper St. Clair School District. Over a four-year period, Christiana's annual salary increased from $ 58,000 to $ 71,000. When his salary for 1984-1985 was under consideration, members of the School Board expressed concern that an additional increase would generate negative publicity. A newspaper reporter's comment that Christiana's salary at that time exceeded that of Pennsylvania's Governor was repeated in the headlines of a local newspaper. Unwilling to confront public scrutiny  [**946]  of a salary increase, the School Board elected to freeze Christiana's salary and purchased a single premium annuity for the purpose of purchasing prior years' seniority pension credit.

Richard J. Mancini, the School District's business manager, testified that Christiana was the highest paid school superintendent in Western Pennsylvania, including the City of Pittsburgh  [*145]  School District which was ten times the size of Upper St. Clair's School District. Mancini indicated that the single premium annuity was considered as a way to handle adverse public reaction because responses to salary surveys would not [***20]  include that amount. He considered the annuity purchases to be compensation.

Nevertheless, the record establishes that the School District did not report the annuity payments to PSERS as compensation paid to Christiana and did not pay pickup contributions on those amounts. In fact, the School District continued to purchase single premium annuities even when salary increases were approved in subsequent years. In the 1987-1988 school year, Christiana's salary was increased to $ 74,000 and a single premium annuity in the amount of $ 9,500 was purchased. His salary was then increased to $ 80,000 in the following year in which an additional $ 9,500 was earmarked for an annuity purchase.

With respect to the $ 19,200 annuity payment, the School Board's resolutions indicate that it was part of a comprehensive salary and benefits package developed after notice of Christiana's impending retirement. The School Board's initial resolution dated November 14, 1988, contemplated a salary increase to $ 80,000, payment for services of a financial planner not to exceed $ 2,000, continuing medical benefits for Christiana and his wife until age 65, the purchase of three years' pension credit for military [***21]  service 4, and the $ 19,200 annuity purchase. On January 9, 1989, the resolution was rescinded. A second resolution was adopted which incorporated all of the earlier provisions, but split the $ 19,200 into two separate annuity purchases.

FOOTNOTES

4 The amount expended by the School District for this purchase was approximately $ 21,000. Christiana did not seek to include this amount in the computation of his retirement benefits.


The Commonwealth Court concluded that the Board did not err in excluding the annuity payments from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary. As to the 1988-1989 salary and benefits package, the court found that the record was devoid of any evidence that the package was in accord with the  [*146]  District's regular and standard yearly compensation practices, particularly those involving Christiana himself over the ten-year term of his employment.

We find that the Commonwealth Court did not err in concluding that none of the annuity purchases were includable as compensation for purposes of [***22]  determining Christiana's final average salary. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Retirement Board's conclusions that the annuity payments were remuneration that was not based on the standard salary schedule for which Christiana was rendering service, and that the $ 19,200 payment was a severance payment. Therefore, under the Retirement Code and applicable regulations, the annuity payments were properly excluded from the computation of Christiana's final average salary.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Montemuro, who was sitting by designation, did not participate in the decision of this case.    


166 Pa. Commw. 300, *; 646 A.2d 645, **;
1994 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 436, ***

ROBERT D. CHRISTIANA, Petitioner v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYES' RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent

NO. 1745 C.D. 1993

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

166 Pa. Commw. 300; 646 A.2d 645; 1994 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 436

March 2, 1994, ARGUED


July 28, 1994, FILED

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for Allowance of Appeal and/or Cross-Petition Granted December 7, 1994.

PRIOR HISTORY:  [***1]  APPEALED From File No. 117-16-8296. State Agency, Public School Employes' Retirement Board.

COUNSEL: Reed B. Day for petitioner.

Louis J. Sheehan, Assistant Counsel, for respondent.

JUDGES: BEFORE: HONORABLE DAVID W. CRAIG, President Judge, HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Judge, HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge, HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge, HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge, HONORABLE SANDRA SCHULTZ NEWMAN, Judge.

OPINION BY: JAMES R. KELLEY
OPINION


 [*302]   [**646]  OPINION BY JUDGE KELLEY

Robert D. Christiana, the former Superintendent of the Upper St. Clair School District (District) appeals from an order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board (Board) which denied the inclusion of certain annuities purchased for Christiana by the District in the calculation of his final average salary under the Public School Employes' Retirement Code (Retirement Code). 1

FOOTNOTES

1 Act of October 2, 1975, P.L. 298, as amended,
24 P.S. §§ 8101 - 8104.


The Board made extensive findings of fact. Those findings relevant to the present [***2]  appeal may be summarized as follows. Christiana was first employed by the District in July, 1979 at the initial salary of $ 52,000. Christiana's salaries for the subsequent school years were:


1980-1981
$ 58,000
1981-1982
$ 63,500
1982-1983
$ 65,723
1983-1984
$ 71,000


 [*303]  The following amounts were initially reported to the Public School Employes' Retirement System (PSERS) as Christiana's salary for the next five school years:


1984-1985
$ 71,000
1985-1986
$ 71,000
1986-1987
$ 71,000
1987-1988
$ 74,000
1988-1989
$ 80,000


In November 1988, the Upper St. Clair School Board (School Board) became aware of Christiana's intention to retire from his position at the end of the 1988-1989 school year. Christiana formally retired in August, 1989.

At its November 14, 1988 meeting, the School Board adopted resolutions concerning the 1988-1989 salary and benefits payable to  [**647]  or for the benefit of Christiana. Among the resolutions was one which directed the District to provide Christiana "with an annuity or other equivalent payment at a cost to the District of $ 19,200 for the purposes of purchasing for the Superintendent pension credit under the State Retirement Plan [***3]  … ."

On January 9, 1989, the School Board met and rescinded its resolutions of November 14, 1988, adopting the following relevant resolutions in their place:
RESOLVED, that the District, in recognition of the superior manner in which the Superintendent has performed his duties and responsibilities, shall provide the Superintendent in calendar year 1988 with additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,500; and further,
RESOLVED, that the District shall, at or prior to the retirement of the Superintendent on June 30, 1989, pay to or on behalf of the Superintendent additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,700 plus an amount necessary to purchase for the Superintendent three years' pension credit under the State Retirement Plan in recognition of his service in the United States Air Force, as permitted by the laws of Pennsylvania. 2


FOOTNOTES

2 The amount necessary to purchase the pension credit for military service was slightly in excess of $ 20,000; however,
Christiana does not seek to characterize this expenditure as "compensation" under the Retirement Code.


 [***4]   [*304]  Pursuant to this resolution, the District purchased an annuity for Christiana in the amount of $ 9,500, but this expenditure was not directly reflected as Christiana's regular salary. 3 In contradistinction, the District in 1989 directly paid Christiana an additional $ 9,700 which increased his regular salary from $ 80,000 to $ 89,700. The $ 9,700 was separately accounted for and deducted from Christiana's take-home salary. The District purchased an annuity for Christiana with the payroll deductions.

FOOTNOTES

3 This annuity, and all others subsequently referred to, were purchased by the District pursuant to
Internal Revenue Code § 403(b) which grants special tax advantages to school employees with respect to annuities purchased for them by their tax-exempt employers.


The District reported to PSERS a total of $ 8,730 in payroll deductions starting in March 1989, through and including June 1989, to reflect the additional compensation called for by the January 9, 1989 School Board resolution. 4 After review of the School Board [***5]  meeting minutes and resolutions, on January 19, 1990, PSERS declined to accept or recognize the reported $ 8,730 for retirement credit purposes.

FOOTNOTES

4 The $ 8,730 in payroll deductions reported to PSERS represented a $ 970 shortfall from the $ 9,700 deduction authorized by the School Board.


By letter to PSERS dated February 9, 1990, the District resubmitted Christiana's reported salary for the 1988-1989 school year. The letter broadened the reporting period to encompass deductions made between January 1, 1989 and June 30, 1989, and adjusted the total salary accordingly. The letter read, in part:
On the original 1st quarter report $ 970.00 of additional compensation was not reported in February, 1989.
Further, in reviewing the report for the 4th quarter of 1988 we discovered that a payment of $ 9,500.00 to Dr. Christiana was also not reported.
The District views these payments as merit increases, no different than merit pay which is paid in accordance with  [*305]  our negotiated agreement with the teachers of  [***6]  the School District.
At the administrative hearing held September 11, 1991 before a hearing examiner to consider the issue of whether the $ 19,200 (comprised of $ 9,500 + $ 9,700) (Enhancement II) paid to Christiana in the 1988-1989 school year should be considered Retirement Code compensation for the purposes of calculating the final average salary, PSERS was made aware that additional remuneration was awarded to Christiana not only in his final year of service but also for the four previous school years (1984-1988) (Enhancement I). At the hearing, for the first time Christiana sought to add Enhancement I to the salaries previously reported to PSERS for the respective years for inclusion as Retirement Code compensation.

 [**648]  According to the relevant School Board meeting minutes, the Enhancement I payments were intended to compensate Christiana "in lieu of salary increases" for the given years. The pertinent resolutions directed that the District purchase a single premium annuity for Christiana for the purposes of purchasing prior years seniority pension credit at the following amounts:


1984-1985
$ 5,000  
1985-1986
$ 7,000  
1986-1987
$ 10,000
1987-1988
$ 9,500 


None [***7]  of these amounts were reflected in Christiana's take-home pay, nor were the amounts formally reported to PSERS as salary.

The hearing examiner recommended that Enhancement II be excluded from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary because the amounts were properly characterized as non-includable "severance payments" under the Retirement Code. The hearing examiner recommended further that Enhancement I be included in the calculation of final average salary because such amounts were properly characterized as includable Retirement Code compensation. Christiana appealed to the Board.

Concerning Enhancement I, the Board concluded that Christiana's non-salary reduction tax shelter annuity payments  [*306]  may not be included in Retirement Code compensation because such payments are non-standard and/or non-regular remuneration as well as being bonuses and fringe benefits. Similarly, the Board concluded that the Enhancement II payments were components of a severance package none of which may be included in Retirement Code compensation because such payments must be characterized as non-includable bonuses and fringe benefits. It is from that order that Christiana now appeals to this court.

 [***8]  On appeal, Christiana argues (1) that he is entitled to have his final average salary adjusted in order to receive retirement credit for single premium tax-sheltered annuities purchased for him by his employer in lieu of salary increases; (2) that PSERS may not sua sponte utilize statistical and public policy considerations when denying a claim for retirement benefits which were not raised before the hearing examiner; (3) that the Board denied Christiana due process by overruling the hearing examiner without providing Christiana reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard; and, (4) that the Board denied Christiana due process by commingling the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in determining Christiana's eligibility for benefits.

We note that HN1o to the description of this Headnote.our scope of review from adjudications of administrative boards is limited to a determination of whether the board committed an error of law, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
Finnegan v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 584, 560 A.2d 848 (1989).

Christiana first [***9]  argues that the Board erred in failing to give effect to the relevant portions of the Fiscal Code of the Commonwealth 5 which expressly authorize the inclusion of tax-deferred income as credit for customary retirement plans. For five years, Christiana argues, the District purchased qualified tax-deferred annuities for Christiana in accordance with the HN2o to the description of this Headnote.Fiscal Code, which provides in relevant part:
 [*307]  The state treasurer shall pay all grants, salaries, annuities, gratuities, and pensions established by law … the treasurer or other officer in charge of payrolls for any … political subdivision may make systematic investments in mutual funds, savings accounts or government bonds or make premium payments on life insurance or annuity contracts to any institution or company licensed and authorized … to accept depositsfor the purpose of funding a deferred compensation program for employes.
72 P.S. § 4521 (emphasis provided by Christiana).

Moreover, Christiana asserts, the Fiscal Code authorizes the purchase of annuities through a deferred compensation program:
 [**649]  HN3o to the description of this Headnote.(a) The governing body of any … political subdivision may, by contract, agree with any employe  [***10]  to defer, a portion of that employe's compensation and may subsequently, with the consent of the employe, purchaseannuity contracts … .


* * *
(e) Such deferred compensation program shall be in addition to, and not a part of, any other retirement benefit program provided by law for employes of the … political subdivision. Income deferred under programs authorized by this act shall continue to be included as regular compensation for the purpose of computing deductions for employe contributions to retirement and pension programs and for the purpose of computing retirement and pension benefits earned by any employe.
72 P.S. § 4521.1(a), (e), (emphasis provided by Christiana).

Christiana maintains that these provisions of the Fiscal Code permit the use of tax-deferred annuity payments which may be purchased by deferring a portion of an employee's compensation. Such deferred income, Christiana contends, is then to be included in the computation of the employee's retirement and pension benefits.

FOOTNOTES

5 Act of March 30, 1811, P.L. 145, as amended,
72 P.S. §§ 4521 - 4521.2.


 [***11]  We cannot disagree with Christiana's reading of the Fiscal Code provision set forth above. However, his argument continues,  [*308]  advancing the assertion that the Board erred by characterizing the annuities as non-salary reduction purchases, or non-regular remuneration, thus rendering such payments ineligible for inclusion as compensation under its interpretation of the Retirement Code.

HN4o to the description of this Headnote.
Section 8102 of the Retirement Code sets forth the following relevant definitions:
"Compensation." Pickup contributions plus any remuneration received as a school employee excluding refunds for expenses incidental to employment and excluding severance payments.
"HN5o to the description of this Headnote.Final average salary." The highest average compensation received as an active member during any three nonoverlapping periods of 12 consecutive months … .
"HN6o to the description of this Headnote.Pickup contributions." Regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.
"HN7o to the description of this Headnote.Severance payments." Any payments for unused vacation or sick leave and any additional compensation contingent upon retirement including payments in excess of the scheduled or customary [***12]  salaries provided for members within the same governmental entity with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.
24 P.S. § 8102.

HN8o to the description of this Headnote.
Section 211.2 of Title 22 of the Pennsylvania Code expands upon the definition of Retirement Code compensation, in pertinent part:
Excludes a bonus, severance payment or other remuneration or similar emoluments received by a school employe during his school service not based on the standard salary schedule for which he is rendering service. It shall exclude payments for unused sick leave, unused vacation leave, bonuses for attending school seminars and conventions, special payments for health and welfare plans based on the hours employed or any other payment or similar emoluments  [*309]  which may be negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement for the express purpose of enhancing the compensation factor for retirement benefits.
22 Pa. Code § 211.2 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Board has developed general concepts in understanding the Retirement Code's meaning of "compensation": "standard salary" and "regular remuneration". Based upon its interpretation of the Retirement Code and accompanying regulations,  [***13]  standard salary and regular remuneration are defined by the Board as take-home cash, including, among others, (i) amounts withheld for tax remittances; (ii) amounts picked up as contributions to PSERS; and (iii) amounts appropriately deferred in qualifying deferred compensation programs, and excluding, fringe benefits, bonuses, severance payments, and non-salary reduction
Internal Revenue Code § 403(b) tax sheltered  [**650]  annuities. Board's opinion, June 24, 1993, pp. 16-17 (emphasis added).

Based on its interpretation of the guiding statutes and regulations, the Board characterized both Enhancement I and II payments to Christiana as non-standard salary, non-regular remuneration, bonuses and fringe benefits. Additionally, the Board characterized Enhancement II as part of a severance payment. Therefore, the Board denied the inclusion of both the Enhancement I and Enhancement II annuity payments in the calculation of Christiana's final average salary.

HN9o to the description of this Headnote.The Board is charged with the execution and application of the Retirement Code and the Board's interpretation should not be overturned unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous.
Panko v. Public School Employees' Retirement System, 89 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 419, 492 A.2d 805 (1985). [***14]  Accordingly, our review of the record suggests that the Board did not err in excluding the annuity payments from the calculation of Christiana's final average salary.

In each of the school years in which Christiana received an Enhancement I payment, the School Board adopted resolutions which directed that "in lieu of a salary increase" for that year, Christiana would benefit from the purchase of a single  [*310]  premium annuity for the purpose of purchasing prior years seniority pension credit. Christiana testified that the Enhancement I annuity payments were used as a means of rewarding Christiana without representing to the taxpayers of Upper St. Clair that his "salary" was substantially increased each year. (Original Record, Transcript of Hearing held September 11, 1991, at pp. 16-18.) Christiana testified he believed that his total compensation included his base reported salary, plus the additional amounts provided for the purchase of the annuities. (Id. at pp. 25-26.) The District's business manager at the time, Richard Mancini, testified that in his opinion "there was no doubt" the annuity payments were compensation. (Id. at p. 67.)

Referring to the first annuity payment of  [***15]  $ 5,000 in 1984-1985, Dina J. Fulmer, a School Board member at the time testified as follows:
Q: What did you understand this $ 5,000 to be?
A: It was a -- well, a reward for his performance. It was a way of compensating him which would not get our name in the paper again.
* * *
Q: Why were the words in lieu of a salary increase chosen?
A: Well, in lieu of means instead of or actually in place of being that lieu is the French word for place. Rather than increasing his base salary, we just decided to purchase this annuity.
(Id. at pp. 83, 85.)

However, regardless of Christiana's or the District's contradictory understanding, the record reveals that the District did not pay pickup contributions on the annuity purchases made on behalf of Christiana beginning with the 1984-1985 school year. 6 Further, in its reports to PSERS, the District did not  [*311]  report the Enhancement I payments as compensation paid to Christiana, nor did the District initially report any of the $ 19,200 Enhancement II payment to PSERS, as compensation or otherwise. Lastly, despite its apparent unwillingness to formally raise Christiana's base salary in the face of public opposition, Christiana [***16]  did in fact receive two regular salary increases totalling $ 9,000 during the five year period under consideration.

FOOTNOTES

6
Section 8102 of the Retirement Code defined "pickup contributions" as regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.


With respect to Enhancement II alone, the record also supports the findings of the Board that the payments constituted part of a severance package. Christiana testified the Board was made aware of his intention to retire prior to their November, 1988 negotiations concerning his 1988-1989 salary and benefits. (Id. at 47-48.) What emerged from those deliberations were resolutions directing (i) that the District, "in recognition of the superior manner in which the Superintendent  [**651]  has performed his duties", pay Christiana additional compensation in the amount of $ 9,500 in 1988; and (ii) that the District pay Christiana an additional $ 9,700 at or prior to his retirement. (Original Record,  [***17]  PSERS Exhibit #10B.)

While the record is silent as to whether Enhancement II was made contingent on Christiana's retirement, it is at the very least payment "in excess of the scheduled or customary" salary Christiana had enjoyed. Further, the final year salary and benefits package, of which Enhancement II was a part, included employer provided amounts for a financial planner, continuing medical coverage for Christiana and his wife, and a one-time offering of a salary reduction tax sheltered annuity. We find the record devoid of any evidence that Christiana's final year package was in accord with the District's regular and standard yearly compensation practices, particularly those involving Christiana himself over the ten year term of his employment.

HN10o to the description of this Headnote.The Retirement Code indicates that the General Assembly wishes to exclude from the computation of employees' final average salary all payments which may artificially inflate compensation for the purpose of enhancing retirement benefits.  [*312] 
Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 153 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 109, 620 A.2d 639 (1993).

Christiana next argues that the Board erred by  [***18]  sua sponte utilizing financial statistics and public policy considerations not considered before the hearing examiner in denying Christiana's claim for retirement benefits. We disagree.

HN11o to the description of this Headnote.The Board, and not the hearing examiner, is the final fact finder in these cases. Dowler. As such, the Board may take official notice of facts which are obvious and notorious to an expert in the agency's field and those facts contained in the agency's files.
Falasco v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 104 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 321, 521 A.2d 991 (1987).

Next, Christiana asserts that in overruling the recommendations of the hearing examiner, the Board denied Christiana reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Christiana contends that the Board made its determination in this matter without his participation and based its decision on facts and issues Christiana never had the opportunity to address.

HN12o to the description of this Headnote.The Administrative Agency Law,
2 Pa.C.S. § 504, states that "no adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard." Christiana was presented [***19]  with just these very opportunities and exploited them by filing a brief and reply brief prior to the hearing; attending the hearing and presenting evidence; and, filing exceptions to the hearing examiner's recommendations, followed by a response to the exceptions filed by PSERS. Our review of the record indicates that the Board studied the complete record, including the arguments advanced by Christiana, in reaching its decision.

Lastly, Christiana raises a due process challenge concerning the alleged commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions between the PSERS and the Board. However, Christiana failed to raise this issue before the Board.

 [*313]  We have held that HN13o to the description of this Headnote.commingling claims may be waived if they are not raised before the administrative board.
Newlin Corp. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 134 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 396, 579 A.2d 996 (1990). 7 Unless a claimant can offer a convincing reason for failing to raise the claim before the Board, the commingling issue is waived. Dowler. Here, Christiana has not offered any explanation for failing to raise this issue below.

FOOTNOTES

7 HN14o to the description of this Headnote.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1551 states, in part, that:
no question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit except (1) Questions involving the validity of a statute … (3) Questions which the court is satisfied that the petitioner could not by the exercise of due diligence have raised before the government unit.



 [***20]  Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge

 [**652]  ORDER

NOW, this 28th day of July, 1994, the order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board, dated June 24, 1993, is hereby affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge



Top of Form

669 A.2d 1098, *; 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 10, **

DR. VERNON R. WYLAND, Petitioner v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYES' RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent

NO. 566 C.D. 1995

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

669 A.2d 1098; 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 10

October 17, 1995, Argued


January 8, 1996, Decided


January 8, 1996, FILED

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:  [**1]  Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied August 5, 1996, Reported at:
1996 Pa. LEXIS 1604.

PRIOR HISTORY: APPEALED From No. File no. 480-24-6298. State Agency: Public School Employes' Retirement Board.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Dee Lafferty Pugh for petitioner.

Louis J. Sheehan, Assistant Counsel, for respondent.

JUDGES: BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge, HONORABLE GEORGE T. KELTON, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY: JAMES R. KELLEY
OPINION


 [*1100]  OPINION BY JUDGE KELLEY

FILED: January 8, 1996

Dr. Vernon R. Wyland, the former Superintendent of the Garnet Valley School District (school district) appeals from the order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board (board) adopting a hearing examiner's calculation of his final average salary used to determine his retirement benefits under the Public School Employees' Retirement Code (Retirement Code). 1 We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1
24 Pa.C.S. §§ 8101 - 8534.


The relevant facts as found by the hearing examiner, and adopted by the board, may be summarized as follows. Wyland became a member of the Public School Employes' Retirement System (PSERS) by virtue of his employment [**2]  with the Shaler Area School District on June 1, 1983. On July 1, 1987, he began service with the Garnet Valley School District as the District Superintendent for the 1987-1988 school year, at an annual salary of $ 65,000. On December 16, 1988, his annual salary for the 1988-1989 school year was increased to $ 70,200, retroactive to July 1, 1988. On March 28, 1990, Wyland's annual salary for the 1989-1990 school year was increased to $ 74,412, retroactive to July 1, 1989. Wyland's annual salary for the 1990-1991 school year was increased to $ 94,481 as of June 30, 1991.

During the 1989-1990 school year, the school district experienced a prolonged labor action with intense teacher contract negotiations which continued until a new contract was signed in June of 1990. During the labor action, the teachers went out on strike for a period of 25 to 30 days. As a result of the contract negotiations and work stoppage, Wyland became the target of community pressures and antagonisms and he also became the subject of a vote of "no confidence" from the teachers.

During the same period, the school district was engaged in a building program involving the construction of a new middle school building [**3]  and other renovations. At that time, the Garnet Valley Board of School Directors (school board) was sensitive to the adverse public reaction to cost overruns associated with the building program. The teachers' contract negotiations and public reaction to the work stoppage contributed to a significant turnover in the composition of the school board. Six school board members changed as a result of resignations, and new members who were appointed came to the school board predisposed against Wyland as a result of the labor situation and the cost overruns.

As a result, in November of 1990, Wyland was informed by the president of the school board that his contract would not be extended beyond its expiration date of June 30, 1991. Because the school board did not want to take public action on their decision, Wyland was asked if he would rather resign from his position. Wyland concluded that it would be best to resign as he felt it would be easier to tell prospective employers that he had resigned, rather than to say that his contract had not been extended.

After negotiations regarding the terms of Wyland's resignation, on November 21, 1990, the president of the school board sent him a letter [**4]  outlining the terms under which he could resign. The letter stated, inter alia:

3)
The [School] Board guarantees the payment to you of your full salary through June 30, 1991. That salary will not be reduced between now and June 30, 1991.
(a) Your annual raise, ordinarily effective January, 1991, will be deferred. As part of your salary, and in lieu of the annual raise in January, the [School] Board will purchase from you all unused vacation days credited to your account as of June 30, 1991 … .


(b)
Additionally, at the conclusion of your contract on June 30, 1991, the [School] Board, as part of your annual raise, will pay you for all unused sick days then credited to your account … .


(c)
Notwithstanding Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), you have agreed to reimburse the District for its share of the retirement cost allocable to the inclusion of that portion of your salary  [*1101]  represented by payments under Paragraph 3(a) and 3(b).
Wyland accepted the proposed terms as outlined in the letter.

On November 26, 1990, Wyland submitted his letter of resignation, contingent upon the school board's acceptance of the proposed terms in [**5]  the president's letter. At its regular meeting on November 27, 1990, the school board accepted Wyland's resignation effective June 30, 1991. The school board did not take a public vote regarding the content and financial terms of the November 21, 1990 letter to avoid disclosure of their action.

By letter dated June 20, 1991, Wyland submitted a memorandum to the school district's director of business and support services which summarized his accumulated vacation days and sick days. On June 25, 1991, Wyland and the school board president signed a letter of agreement which contained identical terms as outlined in the letter of November 21, 1990.

On June 28, 1991, the school district issued Wyland a check in the amount of $ 20,069.40 as payment for his unused sick days, vacation days and comp days. The payroll document computing Wyland's vacation and sick days noted that the payment was to be considered compensation as per the November 21, 1990 letter of agreement. As required by the letter of agreement, Wyland reimbursed the school district for its share of the retirement costs allocable to the inclusion of the $ 20,069.40 payment.

On June 28th, Wyland also entered into an agreement [**6]  with the school district releasing the school district from any future liability concerning his resignation, in exchange for the payment of $ 20,069.40. The agreement referred to this payment as a "severance payment". Wyland was required to sign the release agreement in order to receive the $ 20,069.40 payment. He signed the release agreement and received the payment.

On September 17, 1991, PSERS received a retirement application from Wyland with an effective date of retirement of June 29, 1991. PSERS contacted the school district regarding the $ 20,069.40 payment to Wyland. The school district sent PSERS a copy of the minutes of the school board meeting in which Wyland formally submitted his resignation, and indicated that no information from his personnel file could be released without his written consent. PSERS then informed the school district that in the absence of any written evidence concerning the reason for the payment, the $ 20,069.40 would not be used to calculate Wyland's retirement benefits. Wyland was sent copies of both letters from PSERS, but his consent for the release of information from his personnel file was never requested by PSERS.

Initially, Wyland's retirement [**7]  benefits were calculated by PSERS using a "final average salary" of $ 79,698. However, without the necessary documentation, the $ 20,069.40 was removed from PSERS' computation of his final average salary. As a result, his retirement benefits were recalculated using a final average salary of $ 73,008. By letter dated April 8, 1992, PSERS informed Wyland that his benefits had been recomputed, and that he was required to repay $ 7,619.03 that he had received in overpayment.

By letter dated April 23, 1992, Wyland requested that PSERS include the $ 20,069.40 in its calculation of his final average salary. On July 1, 1992, PSERS notified Wyland that its Appeals Committee had denied his request. By letter dated July 28, 1992, Wyland requested an administrative hearing.

On July 6, 1993, a hearing was scheduled and held before an independent hearing examiner. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the briefs and motions submitted by the parties, the hearing examiner concluded that the $ 20,069.40 paid to Wyland was a severance payment, and should not be considered in the calculation of his final average salary. In this regard, the hearing examiner specifically found the following:  [**8] 
1. At the time of the November 21, 1990 agreement, [the school district] was under a great deal of political pressure due to the recent teacher strike and cost overruns at the middle school project and [Wyland]'s raise was motivated by [the school district]'s need for [Wyland]'s cooperation.
2. The November 21, 1990 agreement was designed as a buyout of [Wyland]'s  [*1102]  vacation and sick days, both items regularly purchased by [the school district] at the end of a superintendent's term, and both items that would not normally be considered standard salary.
3. Both [Wyland] and [the school district] represented to the general public that [Wyland]'s pay for the 1990-1991 school year was $ 74,412.00, and it would be unfair to now allow [Wyland] to claim a higher pay for retirement purposes.
4. The November 21, 1990, agreement required [Wyland] to reimburse [the school district] for its share of the retirement cost allocable to the inclusion of the $ 20,069.40 payment into [Wyland]'s salary. With a regular salary increase this retirement cost would have been the responsibility of [the school district].
5. [Wyland] was required [**9]  to sign the June 28, 1991, release agreement in order to receive the $ 20,069.40 payment and the release agreement referred to the money as a severance payment.
The hearing examiner also found, inter alia, that: the payment was not based on the standard salary schedule for which Wyland was rendering service; the payment was not made under the school district's scheduled or customary salary scale; and, the payment was made contingent upon Wyland's "retirement" as that term includes terminations which result in the immediate receipt of a pension.

Both Wyland and PSERS filed exceptions to the hearing examiner's decision with the board. The board adopted the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. Wyland then filed a petition for review in this court appeal.

On appeal, Wyland claims: (1) the board erred in determining that the $ 20,069.40 payment in his final year of employment constituted severance pay rather than compensation, thereby reducing his final average salary used for the calculation of his retirement benefits; and (2) his due process rights were denied by PSERS' failure to request information from [**10]  him before eliminating the $ 20,069.40 from its calculation of his final average salary, and by the commingling of the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of PSERS and the board.

We note that HN1o to the description of this Headnote.our scope of review from adjudications of administrative boards is limited to a determination of whether the board committed an error of law, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
Christiana v. Public School Employees' Retirement Board, 166 Pa. Commw. 300, 646 A.2d 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); Dowler v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 153 Pa. Commw. 109, 620 A.2d 639 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Because the board is charged with the execution and application of the Retirement Code, the board's interpretation should not be overturned unless it is clear that its construction of the Retirement Code is erroneous. Christiana.

Wyland first argues that the board erred in determining that the $ 20,069.40 payment in his final year of employment constituted a severance payment rather than compensation. In particular, Wyland claims that: there is no evidence that the increase was paid contingent upon his retirement; there is no substantial evidence [**11]  that it was payment for his unused vacation or sick time; his resignation at the end of his contract term cannot be considered to be his "retirement"; the increase was consistent with the school district's compensation plan; and it made his salary comparable to other superintendents in Delaware County.

HN2o to the description of this Headnote.Both the Retirement Code and the applicable regulations contain restrictions on the types of compensation that may be used in calculating an employee's final average salary.
Hoerner v. Public School Employes' Retirement Board, 655 A.2d 207 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). The purpose of these restrictions is to ensure the actuarial soundness of the retirement fund by preventing employees from artificially inflating compensation as a means of receiving greater retirement benefits. Id.

HN3o to the description of this Headnote.
Section 8102 of the Retirement Code sets forth the following relevant definitions:
"Compensation." Pickup contributions plus any remuneration received as a school employee excluding refunds for expenses  [*1103]  incidental to employment and excluding any severance payments.
"Final average salary." The highest average compensation received as an active member during any three nonoverlapping [**12]  periods of 12 consecutive months … .
"Pickup contributions." Regular or joint coverage member contributions which are made by the employer for active members for current service on and after January 1, 1983.
"Severance payments." Any payments for unused vacation or sick leave and any additional compensation contingent upon retirement including payments in excess of the scheduled or customary salaries provided for members within the same governmental entity with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service.
24 Pa.C.S. § 8102 (emphasis added).

HN4o to the description of this Headnote.Title
22 Pa. Code § 211.2 also defines compensation as follows:
Compensation - Excludes a bonus, severance payment or other remuneration or similar emoluments received by a school employe during his school service not based on the standard salary schedule for which he is rendering service. It shall exclude payments for unused sick leave, unused vacation leave, bonuses for attending school seminars and conventions, special payments for health and welfare plans based on the hours employed or any other payment or similar emoluments which may be negotiated [**13]  in a collective bargaining agreement for the express purpose of enhancing the compensation factor for retirement benefits. (Emphasis added.)
HN5o to the description of this Headnote.Whether or not a payment must be considered a severance payment is a question of law. Dowler. Under the Retirement Code, all payments, other than those for regular professional salary, which are part of an agreement in which a professional member agrees to terminate school service by a date certain, are prima facie severance payments. Id. A claimant may rebut a prima facie case only by showing that the payment is in accord with the scheduled or customary salary scale within the school district for personnel with the same educational and experience qualifications who are not terminating service. Id.

In this case, both the hearing examiner and the board were presented with the letters of agreement between Wyland and the school board president dated November 21, 1990 and June 25, 1991 which stated, inter alia, that Wyland would be paid for all of his unused vacation and sick days in lieu of his annual raise, and that he would reimburse the school district for its share of the retirement cost allocable to the inclusion [**14]  of this amount. The hearing examiner and the board were also presented with an agreement between Wyland and the school board president dated June 28, 1991 which stated that the parties had reached certain agreements concerning the termination of his employment and severance payments, the terms of which were embodied in the letter of June 25. The hearing examiner and the board were also presented with documentation that Wyland was paid $ 20,069.40 by the school district for 62 unused vacation and comp days, and 93 unused sick days. Clearly, such evidence is sufficient to support the board's conclusion that the $ 20,069.40 paid to Wyland constituted a severance payment as it is defined in the Retirement Code.

Wyland is essentially asking this court to reweigh the conflicting evidence presented to the hearing examiner and the board, and to only accept that evidence which contradicts the plain meaning of the contents of the foregoing documents. However, HN6o to the description of this Headnote.questions of resolving conflicts in the evidence, witness credibility, and evidentiary weight are properly within the exclusive discretion of the fact finding agency, and are not usually matters for a reviewing court.  [**15] 
Herzog v. Department of Environmental Resources, 166 Pa. Commw. 114, 645 A.2d 1381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Moreover, "this court 'may not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency acting within its discretion in the field of its expertise upon substantial evidence … .'" Dowler, 620 A.2d at 644 (citation omitted). The hearing examiner and the board rejected Wyland's claims regarding this evidence. On  [*1104]  appeal, we will not substitute our judgment nor reweigh this evidence.

Wyland next claims that his right to due process and fundamental fairness was denied by PSERS' failure to formally request information from him before eliminating the $ 20,069.40 from its calculation of his final average salary, and by the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions by PSERS and the board. He first argues that his vested property rights to his pension were reduced by PSERS in an arbitrary manner, without notice and without a chance to respond, thereby violating his due process rights.

HN7o to the description of this Headnote.The Administrative Agency Law,
2 Pa.C.S. § 504, states that "no adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard."  [**16]  Wyland was afforded these opportunities and exercised them before the hearing examiner and the board in this case.

As the claimant in Hoerner, we note that Wyland has failed to cite any authority for the proposition that he was entitled to a "pre-reduction" hearing before PSERS in this case. The determination of Wyland's final average salary and the calculation of benefits is simply the result of a staff function performed by PSERS.

Wyland could, and did, appeal the initial determination of his retirement benefits to PSERS' appeal committee and, ultimately, to the board. He filed a brief and a reply brief prior to the hearing before the hearing examiner, attended the hearing and presented evidence, and filed exceptions to the hearing examiner's determination with the board. HN8o to the description of this Headnote.As Wyland was given notice and a hearing prior to the final determination of his retirement benefits, and there exists no authority for a hearing in connection with PSERS' initial review, this claim is meritless. See
Stone & Edwards Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 538 Pa. 276, 648 A.2d 304 (1994) (The initial denial of an insurance license application was the result of a staff function [**17]  performed by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department; as this decision could be appealed to the Insurance Commissioner who would conduct a hearing before the final determination, applicants were not entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the initial denial of a license application).

Finally, Wyland argues that the commingling of the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions by PSERS and the board is violative of his due process rights. In support of his position, Wyland relies on the case of
Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 529 Pa. 535, 605 A.2d 1204 (1994). In Lyness, our Supreme Court stated:
In the modern world of sprawling governmental entities akin to corporations it would be both unrealistic and counterproductive to insist that administrative agencies be forbidden from handling both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, where such roles are parcelled out and divided among distinct departments or boards. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness are certainly desirable ends. Indeed, each administrative board and judge is ultimately a subdivision of a single entity, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but this does not render their collective work as prosecutors, investigators [**18]  and adjudicators constitutionally infirm, nor create an imminent threat of prejudice.
What our Constitution requires, however, is that if more than one function is reposed in a single administrative entity, walls of division be constructed which eliminate the threat or appearance of bias. … [A] "mere tangential involvement" of an adjudicator in the decision to initiate proceeding is not enough to raise the red flag of procedural due process. … Our constitutional notion of due process does not require a tabula rasa. … However, where the very entity or individuals involved in the decision to prosecute are "significantly involved" in the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, a violation of due process occurs.
Lyness, 529 Pa. at 546-47, 605 A.2d at 1209-10 (citations omitted).

Thus, HN9o to the description of this Headnote.where "walls of division" are erected between the parties completing disparate functions within an administrative agency, no due process violation will be found. See, e.g., Stone & Edwards Insurance;  [*1105] 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield, 537 Pa. 485, 644 A.2d 1186 (1994).

Even if we were to adopt Wyland's position that the initial determination and review [**19]  of his retirement benefits by PSERS and the board constitute "prosecutorial" and "adjudicative" functions, there has been no showing by Wyland of a commingling of these functions as proscribed by Lyness. Wyland's initial application was reviewed by a supervisor in the retirement processing section of PSERS. When he was dissatisfied with the determination of his benefits, Wyland requested PSERS' appeals committee to review his claim. When he was dissatisfied with the appeals committee's decision, Wyland submitted a request to the legal division of PSERS for a hearing before a hearing examiner. The independent hearing examiner conducted the hearing and made a recommendation to the board, which was the final arbiter. The board was not involved in the adjudication until Wyland appealed the decision of the hearing examiner to the board. Such a procedure does not involve the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, and does not violate due process. See Duffield.

Unquestionably, under Lyness, HN10o to the description of this Headnote.the mere possibility of bias under Pennsylvania law is sufficient to "raise the red flag" of the protections offered by the procedural guaranty of due process. Stone &  [**20]  Edwards Insurance. However, the appearance of bias proscribed by Lyness must be one which arises from an actual environment of commingled functions. Id. Wyland has not advanced a claim of the actual commingling of functions in the manner in which PSERS and the board conduct their investigations, prosecutions and adjudications. In the absence of any actual commingling, which would give rise to an appearance of bias, Wyland's unsubstantiated claim of commingling is meritless. Id.

Accordingly, the order of the board is affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge

ORDER

NOW, this 8th day of January, 1996, the order of the Public School Employes' Retirement Board, dated January 27, 1995, at No. 480-24-6298, is affirmed.

JAMES R. KELLEY, Judge
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